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REGULATION OF LAWYERS WITHOUT THE
CODE, THE RULES, OR THE RESTATEMENT:
OR, WHAT DO HONOR AND SHAME HAVE TO
DO WITH CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE?
W. Bradley Wendel*
One of the most striking things to notice when "looking back" on
the regulation of the legal profession is the relative absence of
enforceable legal sanctions for unethical behavior by lawyers. Before
the promulgation in 1970 of the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, regulation of the legal profession was largely a matter
of a fraternal body taking care of its own, and occasionally expelling
miscreants.1 Now, of course, there is a complex body of law, enforced
by courts and regulatory authorities with overlapping jurisdiction, that
governs a substantial amount of the day-to-day activities of lawyers.
The magnitude of this change may be seen simply by comparing the
scope of coverage of books such as Henry Drinker's Legal Ethics from
the middle of the century2 with the multi-volume treatises, looseleaf
services, and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers that are
available today. The change in how the profession is regulated has
vastly outpaced the evolution of legal practice. Despite the frequent
observation that the practice of law has changed in the last thirty
years,3 it has not changed that much-lawyers did basically the same
things in 1965 as they do now, albeit not in multinational mega-firms,
under the same billable hours pressures, or employing the same
technological resources. Charles Wolfram has suggested several
reasons for the markedly increased scope of regulation that occurred
around the promulgation of the Model Code:4 including the judicial
expansion of tort remedies generally, which led to a dramatic increase
in the number of malpractice claims filed against lawyers (a significant
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.

1. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American
Legal Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 469 (2001); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 Fordham
L. Rev. 239,244-45 (1998).
2. Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953).
3. For an excellent history of recent changes in large-firm practice, see Andrew
L. Kaufman & David B. Wilkins, Problems in Professional Responsibility for a
Changing Profession 770-76 (4th ed. 2002).
4. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of the American
Legal Profession-lI. The Modern Era, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 205 (2002).
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source of legal norms governing the practice of law); encroachment by
the regulatory state on all facets of what had formerly been regarded
as private activities; an ideological transformation among lawyers
from public-spirited actors with significant independence from their
clients (think of Brandeis's "lawyer for the situation") to agents of
clients; and, finally, social changes in the profession, such as increased
diversity and the growing number of law school graduates.5 Taken
together, these factors explain a sea change in public attitudes toward
regulation of the legal profession. The modern attitude is summed up
in Wolfram's title-the legal profession has been legalized, just as any
other complex, economically significant industry in the regulatory
state.
In looking back on the regulation of the profession prior to the
promulgation of the ABA Model Code and Rules, the publication of
the Restatement, and the tinkering of the Ethics 2000 Commission,
one wonders how it was possible to maintain any semblance of control
Lawyers are an argumentative,
over the legal profession.
cantankerous, and independent lot, so it seems unlikely that legal
practice would be inherently orderly. Yet, the profession did not exist
in a state of anarchy prior to 1970. The hypothesis I explore in this
essay is that there are nonlegal, generally informal mechanisms
available by which lawyers control one another, from within the
profession, rather than relying on formal, legal, externally imposed
systems of rules. Moreover, these nonlegal methods do a pretty fair
job of maintaining stability and order under some circumstances. The
regulation of a social group apart from the legal system can be
described using a variety of terms: social capital,' reputational
markets 7 nonlegal sanctions,'
non-contractual relationships, 9
"microlaw,"' social norms,' and "nonlegally enforced rules and

5. Id.
6. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community 18-26 (2000).
7. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509
(1994).
8. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992) [hereinafter
"Bernstein, Diamond"l; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L.
Rev. 1.724 (2001) [hereinafter "Bernstein, Cotton"]; David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1990).
9. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963) [hereinafter "Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations"].
10. W. Michael Reisman, Law in Brief Encounters (1999).
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1537 (2000).
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concepts that crop up in the literature
standards ' 12 are all explanatory
13
law.'
without
"order
on
In keeping with this symposium's theme of intentional anachronism,
I would like to consider the use of an old-fashioned concept, honor, as
the basis of a system of social control for lawyers. It actually may be
unfair to call honor old-fashioned, because there has recently been a
vigorous revival of the study of honor in political theory, 14 but to most
lawyers, the word would probably have fusty, aristocratic, and
moralistic connotations. Indeed, the use of the term in common
discourse does tend toward the sanctimonious and conservative.
Lawyers are forever being exhorted to remember some past Golden
Age in which gentlemanly behavior was widespread, hardball tactics
and incivility were unknown, and a man's word was his bond-in
short, a world governed by the popular notion of honor.
In reality, however, the ethics of honor turn out to be much more
complicated. In short, honor is the basis of a system of social control
which places reputation at the fore, and in which public challenges to
the reputation of elite individuals serve as rituals for enacting
normative conflict. The central role of reputation and public acclaim
or opprobrium in the social standing of public actors, such as
politicians, military officers, and business leaders, is a constant theme
in historical studies of honor. Although persons (almost always men)
of high standing formed an elite, their actions were subject to popular
control through the power of the public to diminish the standing of
elite actors. 5 The result is a political ideal that "combines personal
ambition with principled codes of conduct."' 6 In the terms familiar
12. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms:
Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions,36 U. Rich. L. Rev.
423, 435 (2002).
13. Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(1991).
14. See, e.g., Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New
Republic (2001); Sharon R. Krause, Liberalism With Honor (2002). For some of the
leading works that preceded the "new honor literature," see, for example, Kenneth S.
Greenberg, Honor & Slavery (1996). See also William Ian Miller, Humiliation and
Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence (1993); Frank Henderson
Stewart, Honor (1994); Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior
in the Old South (1982); Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society
(J.G. Peristiany ed., 1965) [hereinafter Peristiany]. There has also been a great deal
of interest taken by the popular media in the subject of modern-day honor as
understood in the Balkans and Southeast Asia. See, e.g., Scott Anderson, The Curse of
Blood and Vengeance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (Albania);
Rick Bragg, Afghan and Pakistani Tribe Lives by Its Guns and Honor, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 2001, at Al (Pashtun tribe).
15. Freeman, supra note 14, at 58-60; Krause, supra note 14, at 104. This is a
major theme of Bertram Wyatt-Brown's study of southern honor as well. See, e.g.,
Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 14, 34, 54, 67-72, 113-14, 347-48.
16. Krause, supra note 14, at 99. Freeman similarly notes in the political rhetoric
of the early Republican period an attempt to distinguish between self-serving,
factional politicians and servants of the public good, and the congruence of this
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from legal ethics, honor might be the term given to the virtue of
properly balancing the opposing obligations to be a zealous advocate
for the interests of one's client, as well as an officer of the court.
Honor "retains the powerful partiality of self-concern"', 7 (which, in the
case of actions by professionals may translate into concern for one's
client) but is constrained by the public regarding ideals embodied in
public principles that political leaders and professionals must respect.
Some legal ethicists have been quite candid in recommending the
restoration of honor as the foundation for the regulation of the legal
profession. "The morals of the gentleman are an ethic for the
professions," wrote Thomas and Mary Shaffer."s The authority of the
moral proscriptions recommended by Henry Drinker, for example,
derive from his social status, which reflected his ethical sensibilities:
"He was a gentleman; he knew what made a person morally unfit to
practice law."' 9 Even today, in a society that claims to have rejected
the social role of the "gentleman," television portrayals of lawyers
frequently show the resolution of moral dilemmas by a wise, generally
male, elder statesman, whose experience, judgment, and
craftsmanship mark him as a person of ethical probity who
understands how a good person is supposed to act in practical
situations.2" The virtue of the gentleman can therefore be called
"practical wisdom," giving it an Aristotelian gloss.
Talking about Aristotle and phronesis of course brings to mind The
Lost Lawyer, Anthony Kronman's magisterial work on the legal
profession.2 Kronman argues that practical wisdom, which is the
characteristic ethical faculty of lawyers, is not possessed equally by all.
Through experience, lawyers acquire the ability to balance
commitment to their clients' causes (which Kronman calls sympathy)
with an appreciation for the social interest that professionals are
called upon to keep in mind (detachment). There is no formula or
algorithm which tells a lawyer the proportion of sympathy and
detachment that a particular case demands. An unpopular client
facing the full wrath and power of the state (John Walker Lindh is a
recent example) deserves almost total commitment from his lawyer,
distinction with the notion of honor. Freeman, supra note 14, at 167-68, 170-71, 183,
186-87.
17. Krause, supra note 14, at 108.
18. Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, American Lawyers and Their
Communities: Ethics in the Legal Profession 34 (1991).
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 31. Even a progressive scholar like William Simon is occasionally
impressed by the capacity of moral elites to prevent the degeneration of ethical
standards. He notes the practice of paying "low-risk" bribes in connection with deals
involving tax abatements and building inspections, and contrasts the acquiescence of
low-status lawyers with the "unwillingness of elite practitioners" to facilitate these
bribes. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083,
1130 (1988).
21. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (1993).
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the interests of society be damned. But lawyers for a powerful entity
with the capacity to shape the law in its own interest, such as the
government or a large corporation, must recognize that they alone
have the ability to align their clients' actions with the common
interest; thus, a considerably greater measure of detachment is
required. Appreciating the relevant facts, perceiving analogies with
other cases, and fitting one's actions to the particulars of a situation
are the essence of the virtue of practical wisdom.
The overlap between Kronman's work and the ethics of honor
comes in Kronman's candid admission that practical wisdom is the
province of an elite caste. Although any lawyer can aspire to it, and
through experience gain a measure of practical wisdom, only the
wisest, most virtuous lawyers deserve emulation. These exemplary
figures, called "lawyer-statesmen" by Kronman,22 have worked for
private entities and within government, so they can see issues from the
perspective of both a private client and the social interest. Moreover,
their long careers have given them the financial independence to
decline to take cases from undeserving clients. As a result, these
lawyers and their actions provide ethical guidance for the rest of us.
Something of the awe that the lawyer-statesman is supposed to inspire
can be perceived from Steven Lubet's story of the day Albert Jenner
came to the ordinary peoples' court.23 As Lubet relates the story, he
was a legal services lawyer with a specialization in landlord-tenant and
consumer debtor cases, practicing in barely contained pandemonium
on the eleventh floor of the municipal court building in Chicago.24 No
one was professional or civil to one another, the judges and court
personnel treated poor litigants with undisguised contempt, and the
courthouse regulars were far more concerned with pleasing the
repeat-player creditors and landlords than ensuring that the
defendants had a fair hearing.25 All this changed one day when Albert
Jenner, the former counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee and a
name partner in Jenner & Block, with his "stern countenance, ramrod
posture, piercing eyes, and signature bow tie" unexpectedly showed
up to handle a case:26

[T]he entire courtroom suddenly metamorphosed. The muttering
plaintiffs' bar fell silent. Clerks began answering inquiries from
unrepresented defendants. The judge actually asked questions
about the facts and the law. It was as though we were now in a real
this
courtroom where justice, and people, mattered. Furthermore,
27
effect lasted for the entire day, long after Mr. Jenner left.
22. Id. at 3 & passim.

23. Steven Lubet, ProfessionalismRevisited, 42 Emory L.J. 197 (1993).
24. Id. at 204-06.
25. Id.

26. Id. at 206.
27. Id.
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Now that is honor. Jenner was not just any person with inherent
human dignity and all those good liberal qualities-he was somebody.
His reputation shamed the lawyers and judges around him into living
up to their own ideals. When lawyers resurrect the ethics of honor,
they are thinking of people such as Jenner and Kronman's lawyerstatesmen -people who change the whole atmosphere just by walking
into the room. In a word, gentlemen. The goal of this essay is to
explore whether it would be a good thing to have more gentlemen in
the ranks of lawyers, or whether the world of honor is a world well
lost.
A brief overview of the structure of this essay is in order. Part I
briefly considers the ethics of honor, drawing primarily from the work
of anthropologists and historians. The goal is to construct an ethic of
honor for lawyers, and to imagine how the profession might be
regulated in the absence of rules of professional conduct and the
extensive law governing lawyers. This is not entirely fanciful, for as
Joanne Freeman has shown,2" the public behavior of federal
politicians in the early Republican period was shaped by notions of
honor, which served as a stability-ensuring structure in the absence of
familiar modern institutions such as political parties. Even if one has
little patience for the anachronistic language of gentlemen and honor,
however, or is not well disposed to virtue ethics, in its classical or
modern guises, it is difficult to peruse the recent legal theory
scholarship without noticing an allied trend-the dramatic increase in
the amount of attention paid to social norms and other mechanisms of
nonlegal regulation of some activity. For this reason, part II takes a
synoptic view of the literature on the nonlegal regulation of
commercial relationships. I hope to persuade readers of the value of
looking back at the ethics of honor, because I think the advantages
and disadvantages of honor as a system of social control largely
parallel the costs and benefits of nonlegal sanctions.
In order to demonstrate this claim, I rely throughout the essay on a
case study, civil discovery, to explore the promise and pathologies of
non-state control of a particular social activity. Discovery is a useful
example because it takes place, by and large, under the judicial radar.
Although discovery practice is extensively governed by rules of civil
procedure, these rules largely operate as a shadow over the day-to-day
interactions between lawyers.29 I believe that the real work of
controlling unethical behavior is done by nonlegal regulation. Trial
judges rule on motions to compel or motions for protective orders, but
the vast majority of disputes that arise in the course of discovery are
28. Freeman, supra note 14.
29. The shadow metaphor is from an important paper on the everyday
interactions between matrimonial lawyers. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J.
950 (1979).
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"settled" by the parties among themselves, without judicial
intervention. 3" The incentive structure that governs these negotiations
is provided by nonlegal regulation: lawyers are concerned with
maintaining good relationships with opposing counsel, keeping their
present clients happy, attracting future business, and winning the
favor of judges who preside over their cases. Because they have these
concerns, lawyers are sensitive to informal sanctions such as gossip
and "war stories" that might contribute to their reputations for
aggressiveness or cooperativeness, retaliation by opposing counsel for
uncooperative behavior, and the loss of credibility with the trial judge,
which might result in losing a close call on a motion or evidentiary
ruling.
Discovery practice operates within the shadow of the law, not
subject to significant legal regulation. Discovery has been the object
of a great deal of attention from the drafters of the rules of civil
procedure, including recent comprehensive amendments, without
much effect on the underlying problem of abuse. In federal courts,
the rules were changed dramatically in 1993, with the adoption of
compulsory disclosure, 1 mandatory discovery conferences at the
outset of litigation,32 limits on the number of depositions per case,33
codification of the practice of providing logs for documents withheld
under a claim of privilege or work product protection,34 and
modification of expert-witness discovery procedures.
In addition,
courts around the country have adopted local rules or ad hoc orders
respecting the conduct of discovery, in response to perceptions of
widespread abuse of discovery. 36 Nevertheless, grumbling about

30. As one sociologist reported,
[t]he judges and magistrates who referee the discovery game clearly prefer
to stay above the fray, letting the lawyers decide the outcome. They do not
have the time, staff, or incentives to either intervene in discovery disputes in
a sufficiently active manner, take control of the process, or establish clear
norms about the reasonableness of requests or responses.
Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional,
Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable,
Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 773,
795 (1998).
31. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), (a)(3).
32. Id., 26(f).
33. Id., 30(a)(2)(A).
34. Id., 26(b)(5).
35. Id., 26(a)(2), (b)(4).
36. See, e.g., Appendix A, Proposed Standards for Professional Conduct Within
the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the
Seventh FederalJudicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441, 448 (1992); Discovery Guidelines of
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in West's Maryland
Rules of Court (2002); Guidelines to Civil Discovery Practice in the Middle District of
Alabama, in West's Alabama Rules of Court (2001); Standing Orders of the Court on
Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Dondi Properties
Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
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discovery abuse by lawyers and judges does not appear to have abated
significantly.3 7

A further problem is that judges have largely withdrawn from the

field, at least according to many litigators and commentators.38 In
many cases the judicial attitude toward discovery disputes is to call
down a pox on the houses of both sides,3 9 to give lawyers a "first bite
free" and sanction only repeated or egregious abuses, 4 to split the
difference by entering an order that does not strongly favor either
side,41 to assume that the dispute is just a childish squabble between

disputatious lawyers, and command the parties to go off and work
things out,42 or to chastise the offending party but not impose real
sanctions. 43

Naturally, the incentive for either party to behave

reasonably is diminished if judges do not sanction the aggressor only,
or if the magnitude of sanctions is not sufficient to deter misbehavior.
The response to this umpireal vacuum seems straightforwardappoint more judges and train them to supervise discovery disputes.
There are structural problems with judicial supervision of discovery,
however, that make it difficult to remedy abuse by simply throwing
more judges at the problem.
For one thing, discovery disputes are extremely fact-intensive, and a
careful examination of the record is necessary to determine which of
the parties is at fault for the impasse.' If a judge wishes to create
good incentives and not merely award half of the remedy sought by

the moving party, she must untangle a paper trail of requests,
responses, correspondence seeking clarification, attempts at providing
a response to these letters, and perhaps even arguments at an oral

hearing. This can be impossible for state court judges who must
37. Compare Nelson, supra note 30, at 805, and John S. Beckerman, Confronting
Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 505 (2000), with Wayne D. Brazil,
Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of
Civil Discovery, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 219 [hereinafter "Brazil, Chicago
Lawyers"] (pre-amendments), and Bartlett H. McGuire, Reflections of a Recovering
Litigator: Adversarial Excess in Civil Proceedings, 164 F.R.D. 283, 284 (1996)
(reporting events that occurred before the 1993 amendments).
38. Beckerman, supra note 37, at 561-65; Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra note 37,
at 245-51; Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 787, 824-27 passim
[hereinafter, "Brazil, Civil Discovery"].
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sullivan, 714 F. Supp. 1476, 1486 (N.D. I11. 1989)
("Arguably, attorneys on both sides of this lawsuit have engaged in sanctionable
conduct. In light of this mutual misconduct, the court sees no point in sanctioning
either of the parties."); Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra note 37, at 249.
40. Beckerman, supra note 37, at 574 & n.279; Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra
note 37, at 248.
41. Nelson, supra note 30, at 797-98.
42. Beckerman, supra note 37, at 568; Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra note 37, at
245-46.
43. Beckerman, supra note 37, at 574-78.
44. Nelson, supra note 30, at 795; Beckerman, supra note 37, at 567-68; Frank H.
Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638-39 (1989).
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oversee civil motions calendars with dozens of motions docketed each
day,45 but it is daunting even for judges who supervise individual cases,
given the press of other business. The work is also pretty stultifying.
Discovery disputes are framed by a series of requests, objections and
responses, and subsequent correspondence, in which the parties seek
to redefine the terms used in the requests, set out lengthy objections,
and delimit the scope of compliance to avoid turning over harmful
documents or answering interrogatories in a straightforward manner.
In a complex case, these exchanges will involve convoluted
definitions, general objections incorporated by reference, and
similarly mind-numbing prose. Unfortunately, the tone of advocacy in
discovery is far from high-minded, and is often characterized by
charges and countercharges of sleazy behavior, dishonesty, and
duplicity.46 Few judges have the stomach for the task of wading
through all of this, and would dearly love the parties just to work
things out. Finally, judicial oversight of discovery will not deter abuse
if the rationale for the abusive practices is to impose costs on the
opponent. A motion to compel, with the extensive record that must
accompany it, is a costly undertaking, so the aggrieved party is already
forced to bear some costs as a condition of obtaining judicial relief.4"
Thus, it is worth asking whether nonlegal sanctions might play a
more significant role in controlling unethical behavior in this area.
Another reason to focus the discussion of nonlegal sanctions on civil
discovery is that the ABA section on litigation recently conducted a
careful, interview-based study of the civil discovery process,48 which
can serve as a source of empirical information to test my hypothesis
that informal methods of social control bring order, in the absence of
law, to what would otherwise be an unruly process. Similar dynamics
may exist in other areas of practice, such as transactional work,
settlement negotiations, plea bargaining, and client counseling, which
operate largely in the shadow of legal rules.
Part III then briefly considers how nonlegal regulation might
actually work. This section is a bit more speculative, although there is
abundant anecdotal evidence that the sorts of shaming rituals, gossip,
and tit-for-tat cycles of retaliation that are familiar from the ethics of
45. Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra note 37, at 247.
46. Beckerman, supra note 37, at 568-69.
47. See Beckerman, supra note 37, at 551-52; John K. Setear, The Barristerand the
Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation,Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69
B.U. L. Rev. 569, 593 (1989).
48. For a description of the study's methodology, see Mark C. Suchman, Working
Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L.
Rev. 837 (1998). Useful interpretations by legal sociologists on the findings of the
study include Nelson, supra note 30; Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of LargeFirm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 709 (1998); Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism:A Study of Judges' and Lawyers' Accounts of
Ethics and Civility in Litigation,67 Fordham L. Rev. 809 (1998).
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honor play a significant role in regulating the practice of law. (After I

wrote a paper on the theory of nonlegal sanctions,49 I received

numerous e-mails from former practitioners sharing their own stories
to illustrate these sanctioning processes.) There is also some empirical
evidence from the careful studies of nonlegal regulation in other
contexts, in particular Lisa Bernstein's wonderfully in-depth and
rigorous articles about the cotton and diamond industries." Because
of the wealth of detail in those works, it may be possible to
extrapolate from them to the regulation of lawyers, or to draw
relevant distinctions between these industries and the practice of law.
In general, though, nonlegal sanctions are punishments within the
control of the participants in a given market. In the cotton industry,
for example, untrustworthy merchants may lose business, and
cheating in transactions is controlled by the possibility of negative
gossip that will inevitably circulate about the cheater. In litigation, by
analogy, we would expect to find that certain kinds of conduct will
subject the offender to penalties, imposed either by the adversary at
some later point in the litigation, or by future adversaries who learn of
the offender's reputation. These penalties generally include the
imposition of costs through an unwillingness to deal informally (by
phone calls rather than letters, for example) or by employing a more
expensive litigation strategy (by contesting every legal and factual
issue rather than stipulating, for instance),
Finally, part IV draws these various strands together by discussing
the implications of nonlegal regulation for legal regulation. I certainly
do not think that courts and disciplinary agencies should get out of the
business of regulating the practice of law. The regulatory approach to
many areas of practice is a good thing, as compared with mere
exhortations to behave ethically. Nonlegal regulation is not the same
thing as preaching professionalism, of course, because it works even
with lawyers who are disinclined to act against their self-interest. The
theory of nonlegal sanctions assumes that ethical reasons alone are
not sufficient in every case to inspire conformity to standards of
cooperativeness in litigation. Rather, what is needed is a carrot-andstick approach-tangible benefits such as flexibility for acting
appropriately, and concrete detriments such as the loss of business for
behaving unethically. The difference between this approach to
regulation and formal, centralized legal sanctions is that the benefits
and punishments are determined by other participants in the market,
other lawyers and current and potential clients, instead of by a state
actor. Even with the added incentives of nonlegal sanctions, however,
regulation apart from the state is not always the best solution. For
one thing, nonlegal sanctions may be, exploited as weapons, just as
49. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social
Norms in Professional Communities, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1955 (2001).
50. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8; Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8.
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surely as they can be used as restraints on unethical conduct. There
must be, in effect, meta-norms regulating the use of nonlegal
sanctions, and these norms must themselves be backed up with
effective sanctions. It may be less expensive and cumbersome in some
cases to replace this multi-layered system of norms with an
enforceable legal rule. But, information costs are often lower for
market participants who impose nonlegal sanctions. Where the cost
of proving an ethical breach to an authoritative decisionmaker is high,
as compared with the cost of imposing a nonlegal penalty, we would
expect nonlegal regulation to be more efficient.
In addition to considering the costs and benefits of nonlegal
sanctions, part IV briefly suggests some ways in which changes in legal
norms and the structure of the legal profession may affect the
functioning of nonlegal sanctions. For example, as law firms grow by
merger and acquisition, and open branch offices in different
jurisdictions, it becomes more difficult to control individual lawyers
within the firm. Where firms are smaller, they may carefully cultivate
a reputation for honesty and probity, which in turn provides them a
useful product to sell to clients-namely, the ability to work
informally and therefore inexpensively with opposing counsel. The
larger a firm becomes, the more difficult it is for outsiders to
generalize about its reputation, because there may be individual
lawyers within the firm who vary a great deal in their cooperativeness.
Similarly, as more lawyers practice in multijurisdictional contextssay, frequently appearing as national coordinating counsel in local
product liability lawsuits-it becomes exponentially more difficult for
lawyers and clients in a given locality to learn about the character of
the lawyers against whom they are practicing in a particular case.
Finally, the increasing diversity in all respects (socioeconomic, racial,
gender, clientele, and so on) of the practicing bar makes it more
difficult to rely on considerations of character and reputation, because
the interpretation of actions may be different in these varied social
subcommunities.
The most significant factor in the success of
nonlegal regulation is the size, geographic concentration, and
homogeneity of the relevant market. To the extent legal and
structural changes tend to make the marketplace larger (for instance,
by relaxing conflicts rules to permit firms to become larger), they will
likely undermine the efficacy of nonlegal sanctions, and vice versa.
I.

LOOKING BACK: THE ETHICS OF HONOR

Honor is an ethical system in which one's outward presentation as a
worthy person is confirmed or challenged by others in the relevant
social group, who confer honor on persons exhibiting valued
characteristics and shame on those who deviate from prescribed
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standards. 5' By "ethical," I mean that it is a system of social control
which relates to personal characteristics that can be judged as
normatively attractive insofar as they contribute to the good of
society;52 in this way it is different from fads and trends that form
around ephemeral phenomena such as fashion. Honor is different
from familiar ethical theories, however, in being strongly oriented
toward external manifestations of social status, instead of inner
qualities such as virtues or motivations. 53 "The man of honor does not
care if he stinks, but he does care that someone has accused him of
stinking."54 Indeed, the preoccupation with reputation and esteem
that is most characteristic of honor is perceived as somewhat deviant
in moral philosophy, which is concerned with explaining why people
ought to aspire to act rightly or to be genuinely good, regardless of
whether they enjoy a reputation for probity.
Inner qualities are
important, particularly because the values of an honor group may be
internalized. A person may feel shame for failing against standards
that he has made his own, but that emotional reaction does not alter
the priority of outward appearances, public personas, and
presentation to social peers as the foundations of normative
judgments in an honor system. A person is only actually shamed when
public perception overlaps with one's affective response to having
failed by communal standards. 6
The conditions under which a person may gain and lose honor are
complex and subtle; they may be codified (a project for many theorists
in cultures with a flourishing ethics of honor5 7 ), but these rules are
51. Stewart, supra note 14, at 145-46; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 155; J..G.
Peristiany, Introduction, in Peristiany, supra note 14, at 9, 10-11; Julian Pitt-Rivers,
Honor and Social Status, in Peristiany, supra note 14, at 19, 21-22.
52. Stewart, supra note 14, at 46.
53. Freeman, supra note 14, at 59, 119, 125, 168; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 3, 7,
15; Miller, supra note 14, at ix; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 14, 126-27, 132, 150.
As Frank Henderson Stewart writes, in one of the few philosophical treatments of the
subject:
The more closely one looks at honor, the odder it seems.... Honor is the
reward of virtue, so the old books tell us again and again; yet a virtuous man
can be dishonored through no fault of his own. Someone who wrongfully
impugns my honor... may have to pay a price for it-but he has not thereby
acted dishonorably.
Stewart, supra note 14, at 145.
54. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 14.
55. Compare this to the challenge issued to Socrates by Glaucon in the Republic.
See Plato, Republic, Book 1I, at 358c-360d (Paul Shorey trans.), in The Collected
Dialogues of Plato 606-08 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
56. Miller, supra note 14, at 134-35; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 155, 309.
Shame and honor, in most accounts, are two sides of the same coin. William Ian
Miller summarizes their relationship in medieval Iceland: "In the sagas, the norms of
honor, the norms of proper behavior, in fact, are as often expressed negatively in
terms of shame avoidance as they are positively in terms of honor acquisition." Miller,
supra note 14, at 119.
57. See, e.g., The Code of Lekd Dukagjini (Shtjefen Gjeqov ed., Leonard Fox
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generally internalized by individuals as part of their upbringing so that
they comply more or less automatically, rather than being conscious of
following rules. 51 Most scholars of honor agree that, although it may
in principle be possible to set out the code of honor in detail, in
practice the particulars of the situation matter a great deal in the
community's ascriptions of honor and shame. Indeed,
The shameful could not be reduced to a litany of rules. The
particulars of context were crucial in the determination of how much
and whether shame was done or suffered. The identity of the
the
parties, their past history of dealings, their relative popularity,
59
particular failing at issue, all figured in the moral calculation.
Sensitivity to context-what would be called "judgment" by
professional ethicists today 6 -was essential to evaluating the effect on
a person's honor of an incident and the person's reaction to it.
Because context mattered so much, it was also important that those
interpreting an affair of honor shared a rich set of understandings
In honorabout the meaning of actions, words, and gestures.6
governed societies, the relevant group against which one measured
conduct tended to be small and homogeneous, because larger groups
complicated the business of establishing a reputation, observing one
another's actions, and sanctioning those who deviated from the
group's norms. According to J. G. Peristiany, "[h]onour and shame
are the constant preoccupation of individuals in small scale, exclusive
societies where face to face personal, as opposed to anonymous,
relations are of paramount importance and where the social
personality of the actor is as significant as his office." 62 By contrast,
honor does not work well as a means of social control in large,
fragmented, pluralistic, bureaucratic societies. The obscurity of
individuals in mass societies interferes with the processes by which
communities regulate themselves by means of attaching public
consequences to people's actions.63
Tocqueville believed that any association of individuals who have a
need for order establishes an honor system: "[E]very time men come
together to form a particular society, a conception of honor is
immediately established among them, that is to say, a collection of
trans., 1989) (Albania); John Lyde Wilson, The Code of Honor; Or Rules for the
Government of Principals and Seconds in Duelling (Ray Rilling Publisher 1951)
(1858) (American South). See also the reference in Stewart to Giovanni Battista
Possevino, Dialogo Dell'Honore (1553), a fascinating-sounding, but rare, book about
honor norms in Italy. Stewart, supra note 14, at 89-90.
58. Miller, supra note 14, at 127; Stewart, supra note 14, at 24, 47.
59. Miller, supra note 14, at 119.
60. See Kronman, supra note 21, at 97, 167, 193; Donald A. Schon, The Reflective
Practitioner 59-69 (1983).
61. Freeman, supra note 14, at 74-75, 170-71.
62. Peristiany, supra note 14, at 11.
63. Krause, supra note 14, at 73-75.
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opinions peculiar to themselves about what should be praised or
blamed."6 4
It was important for Tocqueville to distinguish
"aristocratic honor" of the ancien regime from conceptions of honor
appropriate to a democracy, so he downplayed the hierarchical nature
of honor. But it is hard to escape the conclusion, from studies of
many cultures and historical times, that honor is inseparable from
inequality.65
Hospitality and the networking of gift-giving
relationships in the antebellum South defined insiders and outsiders,
and marked off a boundary between people who were of concern to
those of power and influence and those whose fates were a matter of
indifference.66 Similarly, traditional military conceptions of honor
emphasized rank distinctions between officers and enlisted men, and
required the two classes to maintain distance in social relationships.6"
The centrality of hierarchy may be understood as a consequence of
the need for small size and homogeneity. In a large group, it is
necessary to create subgroups in which people can compete for
attention and precedence, and which share the same values and
understandings about how people ought to behave in given
circumstances.
Far more than familiar modern ethical systems, honor relies on an
agon of individuals competing for glory and recognition. The
community confers honor and accords certain rights to persons
marked off as honorable.6" The most honorable members of the
group serve as examples for others to emulate, and their actions are
sources of moral instruction.6 9 (The story of Albert Jenner illustrates
this process at work among lawyers."') At the same time, persons of
honor are always in danger of being knocked off the pedestal, so to
speak, by being challenged and failing to respond appropriately. 1
"[I]f A impugns B's honor, then B's honor is ipso facto diminished or
destroyed, unless B responds with an appropriate counterattack on
A."72 For example, one of the privileges of being a man of honor was
that one's word had to be respected just because it was the word of a
gentleman.7 3 This right could be lost, however, if a gentleman were
64. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 620 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969).
65. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 14, at 62-63, 74; Miller, supra note 14, at 116;
Stewart, supra note 14, at 54, 67; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 331-32.
66. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 80-86; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 331-37.
67. Stewart, supra note 14, at 59.
68. Id. at 28-30.
69. See Peristiany, supra note 14, at 10; Pitt-Rivers, supra note 51, at 19, 22.
70. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
71. Freeman, supra note 14, at 149-51; Miller, supra note 14, at x; Stewart, supra
note 14, at 23-24; Pitt-Rivers, supra note 51, at 26.
72. Stewart, supra note 14, at 64; see also Pitt-Rivers, supra note 51, at 43, 47-48.
73. Freeman, supra note 14, at 67; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 31-34, 36-37, 39,
41, 44, 69, 73; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 56 ("An oral pledge from a gentleman
was thought to be the equivalent of a signed oath ....).
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unmasked as being a liar. For this reason, accusations of lying were
highly inflammatory and even veiled allegations of duplicity could
provoke a violent response. One of the surest ways to provoke a duel
was to "give the lie" to an adversary, publicly accusing him of not
Kenneth
living up to his self-presentation as a gentleman.74
Greenberg notices the interesting syntax of that expression. "The act
of lying did not mean you actually had the lie. Someone had to 'give
it' to you-had to call you a liar. You did not own a lie until you were
called a liar."75
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the United States,
there were a number of words-coward, poltroon, puppy, scoundrel,
They are
rascal-whose social meanings were unmistakable. 6
accusations of being merely a pretender to honorable status, and not
worthy of public esteem. In addition, a communication could be
understood as "giving the lie" despite its speaker's intentions,
freighting the process of political debate with the threat of violence if
the speaker's message was misunderstood.7 In cases where maximum
clarity was required, there were dramatic rituals whose social meaning
was unambiguous, serving as challenges to another's honor; these
included horsewhipping and caning (which implied the victim's
inferior status, because only equals were entitled to duel) and nosetweaking (which struck symbolically at the victim's face, his selfpresentation).7
Once someone gave a person of honor the lie (or pulled his nose,
for that matter), that person had no choice but to demand satisfaction,
in the form of a duel, or lose his entitlement to public respect. The
dueling ritual enabled a dishonored person to regain his social
standing by exhibiting bravery in the face of death-in short, proving
himself willing to prefer death over shame.79 The sangfroid displayed
by the participants on the dueling ground was a critical element to
establishing themselves as worthy of the community's respect."' Thus,
74. Freeman, supra note 14, at 67, 173; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 8-9. The
equivalent in Bedouin society is "blackening," which occurs either by a ritual
utterance such as "May God blacken X's face" or by an act such as placing black
stones or flags in a public place. Stewart, supra note 14, at 82-83.
75. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 32; see also Miller, supra note 14, at 119.
76. Freeman, supra note 14, at 43, 121, 135, 174; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 9;
Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 360. As Stewart notes, only certain insults that touch
on socially valued characteristics count as challenges to one's honor. In most honor
cultures, if A called B a liar or a coward it would lead to a duel, but calling B
"unforgiving, cruel, insensitive, lacking in humility, or uncharitable" would not have
the same effect. Stewart, supra note 14, at 65.
77. Freeman, supra note 14, at 28-31, 83-84; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 16, 1819, 55-57; Douglas H. Yarn, The Attorney as Duelist's Friend: Lessons from the Code
Duello, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 69, 92-94 passim (2000).
78. Freeman, supra note 14, at 172; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 18, 20-22.
79. Freeman, supra note 14, at 167, 178; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 18, 58, 74;
Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 353.
80. Freeman, supra note 14, at 172; Stewart, supra note 14, at 141-42.

1582

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

the central function of the dueling ritual was to obtain public
vindication of a man's claim to honorable status and to underscore his
entitlement to be a political or social leader." Indeed, "men of
various positions in the local hierarchy acted as a Greek chorus in the
Duels only followed the breakdown of
Sophoclean drama. 8' 2
negotiations, carried on over a period of days or weeks, in which
intermediaries tried to assuage the injured pride of the challenger and
provide a face-saving alternative to violence.83 This was often
successful, and the relatively small number of duels involving well
known political figures (such as Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr)
belies the greater number of "affairs of honor" that were settled
before bloodshed.84
Although I am certainly not praising duels or recommending their
resumption, there is at least one aspect of "affairs of honor" that
deserves our attention today. Honor, as a system of social control,
stands apart from state-sponsored methods of regulation. Historically
in the United States, and in modern honor cultures, persons who
respected the ethics of honor would never have countenanced seeking
official legal redress for injuries to their reputation.' As Montaigne
wrote, "He who appeals to the laws to get satisfaction for an offense
to his honor, dishonors himself." 8 And as the historian Bertram
Wyatt-Brown observed, legal institutions did not aspire to regulate
some spheres of activity. According to Wyatt-Brown, "[t]he courts
and lawmakers never put honor into statutory or judicial form
because it was commonly understood that there should be a division
between the workings of the law and the stalwart defense of a man's
sense of self."'87 For example, President Andrew Jackson, after having
his nose pulled by a disgraced former naval officer, insisted on taking
control of the situation himself, and rejected the interference of the
courts in what he regarded as "an affair of honor." 8 As a result of the
stark separation between one's honor (which must be regained by
dramatic personal action) and one's juridical rights, honor serves as a
check on state power. "Its high ambitions make honor difficult to

81. Freeman, supra note 14, at 170, 184-85; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 353-57.
82. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 356.
83. Freeman, supra note 14, at 177-80; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 8; Yarn, supra
note 77, at 87-90.
84. Freeman, supra note 14, at 167. Hamilton alone was a principal in eleven
affairs of honor, refused to engage with another man deemed of low status, and
served as a second in two other affairs. See id. at 326-27 n.13.
85. Stewart, supra note 14, at 79-80; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 370 (noting
that "individuals had the authority to patrol their own social and ethical space"); PittRivers, supra note 51, at 30.
86. Stewart, supra note 14, at 80 (quoting Michel de Montaigne, Essays 85 (bk. 1,
ch. 23) (1958)).
87. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 305.
88. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 20-22.
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subjugate.... "89 The term "sacred honor" in the Declaration of
Independence is no mere rhetorical flourish; the colonists' objection
to parliamentary taxation was precisely that it was dishonorable to be
forced to pay taxes to the metropolitan government, rather than
offering them as "gifts"

through their elected representatives.90

Furthermore, the importance of honor to the self-conception of the
American founders supplied the motivation to undertake the
courageous act of rebellion in defense of the "certain inalienable
rights" being infringed by Britain.91
There is naturally a flip-side to the capacity of honor to ground
resistance to state authority, which is essentially the moral case for the
rule of law. For all the benefits of conscientious objection, jury
nullification, and the "moral pluck" of lawyers who refuse to see
themselves as merely rule-bound hired guns,92 these activities threaten
to undermine the stability of a government of laws and to reintroduce
the anarchy that the legal system is intended to prevent. A legal
public execution and the "communal rite of lynchirig"93 are similar
processes in the sense that they exhibit the triumph of right over
wrong (as those concepts are understood in the community) and
reassert social order.94 But a legal execution proceeds (at least
theoretically) with due process of law, while a lynching is a
paradigmatically lawless act. Significantly, it is lawless, but it is not
random from the standpoint of the community's values.
One of the most important and frequently noted aspects of honor as
an ethical system is its dependence upon the conventions and
practices of a defined social group.95 Honor is not just integrity, in the
89. Krause, supra note 14, at 64.
90. Edmund S. Morgan, The Price of Honor, N.Y. Rev. of Books, May 31, 2001, at
36.
91. Krause, supra note 14, at 97-98.
92. The allusion is to Simon, the most enthusiastic supporter of a style of legal
ethics that encourages acting according to moral principles, even in cases in which the
legal rule would require a contrary action. See William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal
Ethics in PopularCulture, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 421 (2001).
93. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 460.
94. Id. at 369,442,458,463.
95. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 7-9; Miller, supra note 14, at ix, 110-11; Stewart,
supra note 14, at 22-24, 41, 54, 84, 124; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 22, 34, 113-14,
357, 369, 421; Peristiany, supra note 14, at 9-10; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a
Deficient Aspiration for "The Honorable Profession": The Lawyer as Nostromo, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 859 (2000); Pitt-Rivers, supra note 51, at 22, 38; Eugen Weber, The
Ups and Downs of Honor, Am. Scholar, Winter 1999, at 79, 80; 7 Oxford English
Dictionary, Honour, at 358 (1989) (defining "code of honour" as "the set of rules and
customs which regulate the conduct of some particular class of persons according to a
conventional standard of honour" (emphasis added)); James Bowman, Whatever
Happened to Honor?, American Enterprise Institute, Bradley Lecture Series (June
10, 2002), available at http://www.aei.org/bradley/bl020610.htm (last visited Aug. 13,
2002).
One of the dissenters from this view is Sharon Krause, who argues that a
person can be honorable through "forceful assertion of self-respect in the absence of
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sense of living up to one's own moral commitments,96 nor is it
equivalent to moral virtue, although there can be a community in
which virtuous behavior becomes the foundation for a person's
honor.97 Bertram Wyatt-Brown appropriately refers to the "tyranny
of the community,"9' which was the .final arbiter of moral
disagreement.
It is true that a community might recognize as
honorable people who challenge its conventions-that is, there might
be a meta-convention that permits occasional dissent. Thomas
Shaffer may be correct that the fictional Atticus Finch is a man of
honor as well as a prophet, who challenges the community to live up
to its ideals.99 But Finch-type characters are rare, and the more likely
response to ethical criticism is described by Wyatt-Brown, who wrote
about the criticism of slavery in the South: "Any forthright
animadversions about a particular case ...threw doubt on the critic's
loyalty to community values.""' The connection between honor and
slavery must give anyone pause who seeks to rehabilitate the old
ethics of honor." 1
Sharon Krause struggles mightily to preserve the capacity of honor
to ground resistance to state tyranny while simultaneously purging the
concept of its association with inequality and oppression, particularly
its historical associations in the United States with slavery and
segregation. She is correct that honor is compatible with pluralism,
and that sub-communities within a national society may recognize
distinctive conceptions of honor that may facilitate resistance to
government power." 2 She wishes very much, however, to deny that a
public esteem." Krause, supra note 14, at 157. Her strong desire to rehabilitate honor
as an interest capable of motivating challengers to state power apparently caused her
to discount the overwhelming weight of historical and anthropological evidence,
which is summed up well by William Ian Miller:
[I]n an honor-based culture there was no self-respect independent of the
respect of others, no private sense of "hey, I'm quite something" unless it
was confirmed publicly.... Your status in this group was the measure of
your honor, and your status was achieved at the expense of the other group
members who were not only your competitors for scarce honor but also the
arbiters of whether you had it or not.
Miller, supra note 14, at 116.
Another dissenter is Stanley Hauerwas, who argues that honor is more a
quality of character than social recognition, and that acting honorably may require us
to act against societal standards, but Hauerwas is a theologian, and he is construing
the discussion of honor in Karl Barth, who emphasizes that humans can only
participate in God's honor. See Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front:
Theological Engagements with the Secular 58-79 (1994).
96. Stewart, supra note 14, at 51.
97. Id. at 46-47.
98. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 357.
99. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10 Queen's L.J. 1,
15, 20-21, 28-31 (1984).
100. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 421.
101. Id. at 16.
102. Krause, supra note 14, at 98, 118-19.
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pernicious code of conduct recognized by, for example, a street gang
or white supremacists, is a conception of honor.113 Instead, she places
great reliance on Tocqueville's suggestion that a society without
hereditary class distinctions will recognize honor norms that
approximate universal principles of human rights. 104 Southern honor
was a corruption of the ethics of honor, because it was reactionary and
rank-conscious rather than republican, "asserted itself through
mastery of others" (to understate the connection with slavery), and
had a tendency to degenerate into a mere competition for public
recognition, rather than a public-spirited desire to win glory as well as
to serve the common good.105 But preoccupation with external
indications of status is exactly what distinguishes honor from an
ethical system that emphasizes virtue, character, conscience, or the
purity of will. Krause is correct, I think, to admit that "honor is not
always admirable, because it may serve deeply unjust principles" and
that honor is an incomplete account of a good society, because it is not
directly connected to universal principles of rights, equality, or
justice. °6 She argues that the problem with honor in the antebellum
South was not only that it was illiberal, but that it was permitted to
spill out from its proper domain and influence other activities, such as
judging, that should have been conducted according to impartial
ethical norms.0 7 Thus, the only role for honor should be to motivate
officials, like judges and lawyers, to comply with the dictates of
impartial reason.
Krause's revisionary approach inverts the relationship between
moral norms and the community. In her view, honor is a prop or a
backstop that simply provides motivation to do the right thing. Honor
in a liberal democracy ought to be "tied to universal principles of right
rather than to concrete codes of conduct applicable only to a
particular group. '"108 Of course this would be a good thing, but there is
nothing intrinsic in the concept of honor that makes it likely that it
will be connected with virtue or justice. Honor is conferred by the
community-it is contingent upon whatever happens to be valued in
that time and place. Some cultures might value physical strength,
courage, and other martial virtues, while in others it may be that
"power and respect gravitate to sharp-witted men with self-confident,
independent personalities." '°9 As it happens, the founding generation
103. See generally id. at 99, 107. For a discussion of honor in urban gangs, see
Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the
Inner City (1999).
104. Krause, supra note 14, at 107 (citing Tocqueville, supra note 58, at 623).
105. Id. at 120-24.
106. Id. at 127.
107. Id. at 127-28.
108. Id. at 107; see also id. at 73, 99, 129, 139 (discussing how "reverence for the
right codes can be a powerful engine of reform" (emphasis added)).
109. Stewart, supra note 14, at 142.
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in the United States, and successive moral leaders, such as Abraham
Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, and Martin Luther King, Jr., were
committed to the values of the Declaration of Independence."' From
the standpoint of honor, however, these values cannot be judged or
criticized, they simply are. In other words, honor cannot underwrite a
critical morality that stands apart from social conventions.
Indeed, honor may make the critical project of grounding morality
on human dignity and equality more difficult, because of its
preoccupation with status, distinction, glory, and other qualities that
Conceptions of
tend to be distributed unequally among persons.'
honor vary considerably from one culture to another, but one of the
constants in the definition of the concept of honor is
inegalitarianism-some people simply have more of it than othersand this feature of the concept proves to be an awkward fit with
democracy. It is true that even a democracy requires elites, and there
have been no shortage of scholars, from Tocqueville to Kronman, who
equate lawyers with an American aristocracy. In this sense, the ethics
of honor are compatible with the regulation of the legal profession in
a democracy. But the recognition of lawyers as an elite class is
obviously different from Krause's argument that honor is a covertly
progressive notion.
II. LOOKING AROUND: THE NONLEGAL REGULATION
LITERATURE

It would be attractively symmetric to frame this discussion around a
Janus image, looking back and looking forward, but in fact the study
of extra-legal regulation is thriving, perhaps even booming, right now.
In this section, I would like to consider briefly the structure of a
system of nonlegal regulation that might be employed to control
activities in industry or social groups outside the domain of law. In
order for a given structure to be considered a regulatory scheme, as
opposed to a system of etiquette or some less substantial set of social
expectations, a cluster of norms "must provide for responses
sufficiently forceful (1) to clearly characterize offending behavior as
unlawful, (2) to confirm the norm in the face of its violation, and (3)
correct, or effect whatever other sanctioning goals
to prevent, deter,
' 12
there may be."
110. Krause, supra note 14, at 140,146-47,158,173-74.
111. See Greenberg, supra note 14, at 7, 62; Wyatt-Brown, supra note 14, at 345;
Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor, in Revisions: Changing
Perspectives in Moral Philosophy 172 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds.,
1983).
112. Reisman, supra note 10, at 26. For Reisman, perhaps because he is a scholar
of international law, which is constantly having to prove its credentials as "real" law,
it is important that these criteria pick out a system of law as opposed to non-law. See
id. at 13. As indicated in the text, however, I am willing to accept that a great deal of
the regulation of an industry can be nonlegal, in the sense that judicially-enforceable
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I will distinguish mechanisms of social control on two dimensions.
The first is legal/nonlegal, which refers to the extent to which a system
of norms relies on legally enforceable agreements (as in contract law)
or legally enforceable noncontractual rights (tort and statutory
regulation). The second is formal/informal, which indicates the extent
of articulation, specificity, explicitness, and conscious efforts at
systematizing that are exhibited by a scheme of regulation.11 3 A
nonlegal system may be highly formal, as in the private commercial
law governing the cotton and diamond industries, or it can be
relatively informal, such as the reputational sanctions that lawyers use
to control deviant behavior in civil discovery practice. Conversely, a
legal system may be informal, in its reliance on vague factors such as
the reputation of one of the parties or the parties' past dealings,
despite the presence of judicially enforceable penalties.
A. What Are Nonlegal Sanctions?
Empirically-minded legal scholars have long noticed that
participants in certain markets or activities rely on commitments that
are not legally enforceable-banks extend credit on the basis of oral
representations not embodied in the loan agreement; manufacturers
and suppliers deal on the basis of an oral promise or a handshake; and
lenders take the reputation of merchants into account when valuing
their collateral. 14 Despite appearances, these transactors do not go
and
"informal,"
"nonlegal,"
employ
they
unprotected;
"noncontractual" methods to ensure performance. Some of these
regulatory structures are quite elaborate, such as the private legal
systems described by Bernstein. In the cotton industry, for example,
transactions are governed by written agreements, and disputes are
handled by arbitral tribunals, which make decisions based on precise,
industry-specific definitions of key contractual terms."5 In other
industries, this complexity is absent, and the protection for parties to
transactions is a matter of dealing with transactional partners who are
known to be reliable-"[w]e can trust old Max," as Stuart Macaulay
puts it." 6 It is nevertheless appropriate to describe old Max's
reputation as part of a regulatory structure, because it is the basis for
certainty and stability in transactions. Indeed, transactors often prefer

remedies do not attach to the violation of a given norm. Whether the presence of an
authoritative decisionmaker is essential to something being a scheme of law is not
important for my purposes.
113. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1748-52; Charny, supra note 8, at 378
n.13, 399-400, 409-12.
114. Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8, at 154-55; Charny, supra note 8, at 376-77;
Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 58.
115. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1725, 1732-33.
116. Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 58-60.
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to rely on old Max, rather than the legal process, to ensure
predictability.
Although Bernstein appreciates the systematicity of private
ordering, and likens the cotton and diamond industries' network of
written agreements and arbitral tribunals to a parallel legal regime,
she is also well aware of the informal sanctions that maintain stability
in these industries. For example, she confirms Macaulay's finding that
reputation is a critical asset to merchants in a relatively small
community.' 7 What is even more noteworthy, in light of our project
of looking back at the ethics of honor, is the extent to which
reputational considerations in repeat-dealing transactions begin to
approximate a full-scale honor system. As Bernstein observes, in the
cotton industry, "a transactor's sense of self-esteem, his position in the
community, and his social connections were intertwined with his
business reputation, making breach of contract something that would
hurt not only his business prospects but also his standing in his social
community."'
The relationship between one's public persona (here, business
reputation), standing in the community, and perceived moral
character is one of the most salient features of the ethics of honor, and
is duplicated in this modern business community. In this case, the
honor code recognized by the relevant group includes norms that
make the commercial transactions among cotton merchants efficient.
Promptly paying debts, complying with one's commitments (not
"lay[ing] down" on a contract), and being flexible in dealings and
willing to renegotiate contracts when circumstances change, are all
highly valued in the community." 9 This is similar to the practice in
Bedouin society of using the honor of an elder, respected member of
the community to guarantee obligations.12 " If the obligor defaults, the
obligee can threaten to "blacken" the honor of the guarantor, and this
threat almost always results in immediate payment.12" '
Bernstein recognizes the overlap between modern systems of
nonlegal sanctions and the culture of honor, not surprising in an
insular, regionally-concentrated community such as the cotton
industry. Significantly, the diffusion of honor norms throughout the
culture meant that even one-shot transactions benefited from the
norms of fair dealing that were encouraged by the honor code:
In the Old South, the culture of honor was strong. "Laying down on
a contract" or violating the maxim "my word is my bond" would
result in social as well as economic ostracism. As a consequence,
even in transactions between strangers, each transactor had a well117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1745-49.
Id. at 1749.
Id. at 1748-49.
Stewart, supra note 14, at 93-94.
Id. at 91-92.
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founded reason to believe that if he acted honorably
(that is,
122
cooperatively), his transactingpartner would do the same.
A community with widely shared norms can be policed more easily,
because deviation from these norms can be easily recognized and the
offender socially and economically isolated. 23 (Robert Putnam draws
a similar distinction between specific expectations of reciprocity,
which exist on a relationship-by-relationship basis, and a society
characterized by general norms of reciprocity and trust.124 ) The result
of generally diffused norms of cooperativeness is that, instead of
relying on cumbersome formal methods such as contracts, parties to a
transaction could expect people with whom they dealt to cooperate.
The potential transaction cost savings is significant.
The overlap with the ethics of honor points to a significant
precondition for, and limitation on, the use of nonlegal sanctions,
particularly those in which reputation is critical to the functioning of
the sanction. Reputation-based sanctions tend to work best in small,
close-knit, geographically isolated, and homogeneous communities.'25
The reasons are several. First, a group must be small enough that its
members can observe one another, generally through face-to-face
interactions.126 If the group is sufficiently large, most members will
not learn of a breach of the norms of cooperation by one individual.
Second, it must be possible to identify deviation from prevailing
norms of cooperation, which might be difficult if there are a number
of reasonable approaches to a problem that recurs in an industry.
Bernstein reports that because of the volatility of cotton prices,
dealers are expected to show some flexibility when circumstances
change,1 2' but one can imagine a different norm, in which buyers and
sellers are held to the negotiated price, on the grounds that volatile
prices tend not to disadvantage either buyers or sellers as a group, so
short-term losses will come out in the wash over time. There would
be nothing inherently sleazy or opportunistic about a party to a
transaction adopting this attitude; it just happens to be contrary to the
prevailing industry norm of flexibility. If the cotton industry were
sufficiently heterogeneous, though, it would be difficult for a single
stable norm to develop, and for all participants in the market to learn
of it. The result would be difficulty in reading a particular act of
sticking with the contract price as either uncooperative behavior or
compliance with an alternative norm.
122. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1764-65 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 1781-82.
124. Putnam, supra note 6, at 20-21.
125. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1749-50; Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8,
at 140; Charny, supra note 8, at 412; Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically

Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J.
Legal Stud. 349 (1981).
126. See Setear, supra note 47, at 617.
127. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1746-49.
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In an example I like to cite of this phenomenon applied to lawyers,
the chair of the ABA Ethics Committee was asked whether lawyers
could ever lie.
No, he replied, it would be "ungentlemanly,
unlawyerlike, and wrongful."' z But then, when asked about whether
a lawyer might misrepresent his client's settlement authority or
instructions, he backtracked: "Oh,... That's different.... [That's]
tactics."' 29 One could imagine a community, perhaps all members of
the fanciful "National Association of Honest Lawyers,"' 3 " in which
lying in settlement negotiations was considered ungentlemanly. More
to the point, one could imagine lawyers from these different
communities interacting, and being unsure of what is the gentlemanly
thing to do. Consider a different example-secretly taping phone calls
with the consent of one of the parties (generally the lawyer,
investigator, or client). One state bar ethics committee said this
practice "offend[s] a sense of honor."''
Regulatory authorities in
other jurisdictions find nothing dishonorable about it.' Despite the
deployment of the terminology of honor, there is plainly no
agreement on the honorable thing to do. These examples show that
only in a small enough group, in which individuals deal with one
another frequently, is it likely that a single stable norm (either
approving or prohibiting lying in settlement negotiations, or
permitting or prohibiting surreptitious taping) will emerge.
The second reason that nonlegal sanctions tend to flourish in small
communities is that information regarding reputation must be
transmitted, and this generally requires personal communication.
Banks which loan to cotton merchants report that they insist on
getting to know the borrowers personally, in order to assess their
experience and business ethics;'33 however, this kind of investigation
would be prohibitively expensive in a large national market.
Similarly, in order for a community to punish unethical but profitable
behavior-opportunistic breaches, in other words-other potential
transactors must learn of the breaching party's actions so that they can
protect themselves by demanding enforceable contractual guarantees
of performance, or perhaps additional compensation for the
heightened risk of breach.'3 4 In a large, impersonal marketplace,

128. Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive
Method 345 (2d ed. 1998).
129. Id. (quoting Jethro K. Lieberman, Crisis at the Bar 32 (1978)).
130. See John A. Humbach, The NationalAssociation of Honest Lawyers: An Essay
on Honesty, "Lawyer Honesty" and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 Pace L. Rev.
93 (1999).
131. See Maine Prof'l Ethics Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Formal
Op. 168 (Mar. 9,1999).
132. See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422
(June 24, 2001) (citing cases and ethics opinions).
133. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1747-48.
134. Charny, supra note 8, at 413.
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future transacting partners may have no way to learn of past
opportunistic behavior, but in a small, geographically concentrated
industry, "'[m]ost [transactors] know of each other or can call
someone that is in the region to verify some information on a
person/firm they are considering doing business with."'135
Unfortunately, the very conditions that have led to the increased
legalization of the practice of law reduce the likelihood that nonlegal
regulation will be effective in many cases. Although there are
certainly small markets like Charleston, South Carolina (the subject of
a recent paean to nonlegal regulation in the ABA Journal136 ), and
specialized subcommunities such as the bankruptcy and maritime
bars,'37 in which the lawyers know each other personally, a great deal
of civil litigation occurs among lawyers who are strangers to each
other. As one of the lawyers interviewed for the ABA Litigation
Section study put it:
[T]he practice has changed because of the tremendous influx of
lawyers in the last twenty years. In [earlier years] everybody knew
literally everybody who were trying cases in a particular city and all
the judges knew all the lawyers who regularly practiced. It was
much more intimate than the practice is today. There were very few
lawyers that you had to worry about, and people told you things
about
them if you did. That is not the case today, I am sorry to
138
say.

This lawyer was making a point about the flow of information relating
to reputation when he said "people told you things," and in this
lawyer's opinion it is the increasing size of the bar that currently
makes it impossible to learn about the character of other lawyers.
Because of the increasing size of firms, the proliferation of branch
offices, and the influx of lateral hires at firms, it may even be difficult
for lawyers in the same firm to keep an eye on each other. 139 This is a
very different situation from that described by a Charleston
practitioner, who said that "[m]ost of the lawyers in Charleston know
each other," and
from where branch offices operated by large law
14
firms are rare. 1
Thus, it is difficult to generalize about the usefulness of nonlegal
sanctions as a response to unethical behavior. The practice setting can
135. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1752 (quoting Email from Association
Administrator, to Mary LaBrec (Nov. 15, 2000)); see also Charny, supra note 8, at 418.
136. Margaret Graham Tebo, Law in the Low Country, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 2001), at
40.
137. One lawyer interviewed for the ABA Litigation Section study believed that
the local medical-malpractice bar had developed a set of shared expectations about
discovery practice because of its small size and the repeated interactions of the
lawyers with each other. Nelson, supra note 30, at 797.
138. Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 787; Sarat, supra note 48, at 825-26.
140. Tebo, supra note 136, at 42.
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make a great deal of difference, as law students seem to appreciate
intuitively. In a well known discussion problem from a leading
professional responsibility casebook, the lawyer has an opportunity to
exploit her adversary's ignorance and obtain dismissal with prejudice
of the adversary's lawsuit, by agreeing to stipulate to an extension of
time to file an amended complaint, when the plaintiff was required to
seek court approval for the schedule change. 4 ' Each time I discuss
this problem, a student generally observes that if the lawyer took
advantage of her adversary's mistake, the adversary would be sure to
retaliate if they had dealings in the future (in fact, the problem
specifies that the two lawyers have been adversaries "now and
again"), and would certainly put out the word to other lawyers that
"Ms. Niceperson" was not to be trusted when she intimated that she
was willing to modify the court schedule. 2 Generally, however,
another student responds that this would be well and good in (say)
Rockbridge County, Virginia, but Ms. Niceperson may be able to get
away with it in New York or Chicago. I caution the students that even
in larger legal markets there are smaller subcommunities, in which the
information-transmission mechanisms are pretty efficient, and in
which it is likely that two lawyers will be matched up on a case in the
future. It is true, however, that in practices which are nationwide in
scope (such as mass-tort litigation), the lawyers are very unlikely to be
repeat players with respect to one another, so the prudential
arguments against Ms. Niceperson, based on nonlegal sanctions, are
less likely to be persuasive.
B.

Advantages of Nonlegal Regulation

There are a number of reasons why nonlegal regulation can be
superior to the legal system in many cases.
1.

Sensitivity to Context

"[N]onlegal decisionmakers can enforce commitments that judges
could not apply with any degree of... consistency."' 43 Studies of
nonlegal regulation contain numerous examples of conduct that is
difficult to define with the precision that would be necessary to legal
141. See Stephen Gillers, "Ms. Niceperson," in Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of
Law and Ethics 93-94 (6th ed. 2002).
142. Cf Robert E. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods 4-5 (2d ed. 1973). Keeton,
who is now a federal district court judge, observes:
From a long range point of view, as distinguished from concern with the
immediate case only, you have an interest in avoiding customary use of
methods designed to win cases on grounds that may be regarded as unfair,
though legal. A reputation for this type of practice becomes a handicap to
you in representing your clients in future cases ....
Id. at 4.
143. Charny, supra note 8, at 404.
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regulation. For example, the vagaries of the cotton market, including
weather and the conditions under which cotton is stored and shipped,
make it difficult to know whether a shipment of nonconforming goods
was inadvertent or intentional; parties to an enforceable contract
would find it exceedingly difficult to specify conditions under which a
nonconforming shipment should be a material breach, as opposed to
cases in which the purchaser should attempt to negotiate an
adjustment. 4 4 Similarly, because of the volatile nature of the relevant
markets, it is difficult to value ex ante the lost business opportunities
that would be appropriate as liquidated damages in an agreement for
the shipment of diamonds. 145 The evaluation of the quality of
diamonds and a shipment of cotton also tends to be highly subjective;
in the case of cotton, for instance, there are over forty factors that go
into the description of a single lot. 146 The same phenomenon may be
observed in the legal profession, and in our case study of civil
discovery. Participants in the ABA litigation section's study of
litigation ethics defined abusive discovery using terms such as
"burying" the opponent in paper, "mischievous" discovery requests,
bullying in depositions, resorting to "sharp practice," being
"aggressive," or playing "hardball. '147 The lawyers' responses are
reminiscent of Justice Stewart's "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" definition
of obscenity; indeed, one of the study authors reports that '"obnoxious,
14
obstructive litigators" become known simply as "assholes. 1
One interesting finding in the ABA study is that all the lawyers
could identify "assholes" reliably, even though they had a much
harder time stating with precision what conduct justified that label.149
Their reasoning tends to appear conclusory from the standpoint of
someone who is not a participant in the litigation. For example, here
is one summary of the rules of acceptable discovery tactics: "[I]t is
okay to use tactics that lead opponents down dead-ends, to delay in
order to raise costs, and to use discovery to 'harass' opponents. But
all of this must be done without name calling, without doing anything
dishonest, and in the name of a 'plausible' position or goal.""'5 The
definitions of dishonesty and plausible positions are the criteria for
determining whether a move in the discovery game is unethical, but
lawyers generally were not able to give precise definitions of these
144. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1775.
145. Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8, at 134-35, 148-50.
146. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1745-46; Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8,
at 118.
147. Nelson, supra note 30, at 774-75.
148. Id. at 775 ("The transcripts from that point on are littered with mentions of
'assholes."').
149. For a sophisticated discussion of this kind of reasoning and a guarded
endorsement of it in judicial opinions, see Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See
It," 105 Yale L.J. 1023 (1996).
150. Sarat, supra note 48, at 822.
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terms. When another section of the ABA attempted to set out
standards for professionalism in litigation,151 the result was similarly
conclusory:
In litigation proceedings I will agree to reasonable requests for
extensions of time or for waiver of procedural formalities [e.g.
service of process] when
the legitimate interests of my client will not
152
be adversely affected.

I will refrain from engaging in excessive and abusive
53 discovery, and I
will comply with all reasonablediscovery requests.'
In depositions and other proceedings, and in negotiations, I will
conduct myself with dignity, avoid making groundless objections and
refrain from engaging in acts of rudeness or disrespect.154
I will not serve motions and pleadings on the other party, or his
counsel, at such a time or in such a manner
as will unfairly limit the
55
other party's opportunity to respond.1
In civil matters, I will stipulate to facts as to which there is no
56
genuine dispute. 1
The bottom line is not that lawyers cannot recognize unethical
conduct, but that spotting discovery abuse and other misbehavior in
litigation is a matter of "complex discretionary judgment" that cannot
be reduced to a formula or algorithm. 57 For this reason, it would be
difficult to create a regime of legal rules to regulate abusive litigation.
151. See Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism, A.B.A. Sec. of Tort & Ins. Prac. (1.988
annual meeting), reprinted in A.B.A. Compendium of Prof'l Responsibility Rules and
Standards 366 (2001).
152. Id., Standard B(3) (emphasis added).
153. Id., Standard B(6) (emphasis added).
154. Id., Standard B(8) (emphasis added).
155. Id., Standard B(9) (emphasis added).
156. Id., Standard C(9) (emphasis added).
157. Gordon, supra note 48, at 712-13; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 517-18.
Gordon was able to construct a hierarchy of unethical conduct in discovery, from the
most to least serious, but at each step there are evaluative terms (like "unjustified")
that cannot be defined ex ante but which are easily recognized by the parties to
litigation. Here is Gordon's hierarchy:
(1) plain dishonesty, such as making representations about facts that turn
out to be untrue or promises about future conduct that are broken; (2)
unjustified 'hardball,' such as threatening sanctions without plausible cause
or constant interruptions of questioning or instructions to witnesses; (3)
gratuitous uncooperativeness, such as refusing reasonable requests for
rescheduling or sending briefs by ordinary mail instead of messenger; and
(4) tactical unpleasantness or bad manners, such as screaming, insulting,
patronizing junior or female lawyers, and macho posturing.
Gordon, supra note 48, at 713. This is also a contestable ranking. For instance, one
might put some macho posturing and patronizing female lawyers in depositions in the
second category, because it has the same disruptive effect as constantly interrupting
the questioning lawyer. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Aude, 730 A.2d 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999).
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Bernstein also observes that nonlegal sanctions are preferable to
legal ones where legal sanctions would require the aggrieved party to
rely on non-verifiable information. Information is "verifiable" if
"from an ex ante perspective transactors would find it worthwhile to
prove [it] to a third-party in the event of a dispute." 5 8 For example, in
financial markets the participants are attuned to impressionistic
information, such as market trends, that would be exceedingly
expensive or difficult to prove after the fact in an in-court
proceeding.159 The reason why judges tend to abstain from deciding
discovery disputes may be that the information at issue is costly for
the parties to prove to the court. For example, if the issue in a motion
to compel is whether one of the parties has complied fully or
"reasonably" with a request for production, the judge would be
required to read carefully the request, the responding party's
objections, and the follow-up correspondence between the parties, as
well as possibly reviewing produced documents and privilege logs, and
potentially inspecting unproduced documents in camera. This task
tends to be unpleasant, time-consuming, and frustrating.16 It is also
difficult to specify in advance the standards that a judge should apply
because of the situation-specific nature of so many discovery norms.
As one of the reporters of the ABA study wrote:
The answer to almost every question [about discovery practices is] it
"depends." Aggressiveness generally is inappropriate, unless the
Hardball usually is
war was initiated by the other side.
inappropriate unless there is a specter of mischievous plaintiffs'
lawyers waiting to use the information from discovery for other
suits.,,,
As a result, from an ex ante perspective, it appears less efficient to
construct formal, legally enforceable rules that regulate discovery
practice, as compared with allowing the parties to fight it out for

158. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1760.
159. Charny, supra note 8, at 415. Compare the discussion of queuing behavior in
Reisman, supra note 10, at 76-77, 82-83. Everyone who has ever stood in a line
recognizes some of the implicit norms associated with queuing, such as the "unit rule"
(people may cut in line if they are from the same unit, such as a family), and the
"hardship rule" (people may step out of line briefly on the basis of a sufficient
hardship, such as an urgent call of nature). Id. It would be difficult to define from an
ex ante perspective all of the rules and exceptions that apply to standing in line. Id.
For example, not all units count for the purposes of the "unit rule." Id. Family
members at an airport almost certainly count (if mom parks the car while dad waits in
line with the kids and luggage, for instance), but a group of friends standing in line for
tickets to a concert would not fall within the rule. Id. Significantly, the people who
are actually in line do recognize breaches of the norm, and can sanction the violator
using ritualized forms of protest, which both shame the violator and announce to
others that breaches of order will not be tolerated. Id. at 42-43, 86-87.
160. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 518-19.
161. Nelson, supra note 30, at 780.
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themselves, using some of the nonlegal sanctions described in the next
section.
2.

Reduced Planning Costs

According to Stuart Macaulay, the businesspeople he studied opted
out of the legal system in part to avoid red tape-that is, to minimize
transaction costs) 62 In some cases legal regimes can be modified to
reduce planning costs. Where sales of goods are concerned, for
example, the UCC does not require much in the way of a writing to
memorialize the agreement. 63 Similarly, private legal systems can
reduce transaction costs by providing a menu of pre-drafted
contractual provisions that can be plugged into an agreement as
needed. 64 Planning costs are even lower in informal systems, which
are not parallel private legal orders, but systems of tacit
understandings, relationships of reciprocal trust, and the domain of
nonlegal sanctions such as gossip and retaliation. An agreement
based on old Max's word does not need to be reduced to writing and
backed up with either state-based or private formal remedies. Rather,
the party dealing with Max can rely on Max's reputation for fulfilling
his commitments.
In litigation, one might structure dealings with opposing counsel
using costly legal methods such as court-approved schedules and
pretrial orders, formal discovery requests as provided for by the rules
of civil procedure, and confirmatory letters which create a paper trail
if judicial intervention is subsequently required. There is a cost to all
this, which is borne directly by the client if the lawyer is billing by the
hour, and indirectly by the lawyer in the form of the hassle and
aggravation associated with spending time on administrative matters.
rather than thinking about the substance of the litigation. (This is not
aggravating for all lawyers-every big firm seems to have some
members who revel in the byzantine complexities of case
management.) The alternative would be a world in which the parties
trusted each other not to take advantage of the absence of procedural
formalities. In other words, instead of seeking a protective order from
the court limiting the length of depositions, the parties could simply
agree, explicitly or tacitly, not to waste time on pointless questioning
or objections in depositions. If lawyers in a small community were
repeat players with respect to one another, they could probably decide
in advance how much formality was required in dealing with opposing
counsel. That is one finding of Gilson and Mnookin's study of the
elite matrimonial bar in California. 65 When two lawyers with known
162.
163.
164.
165.

Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 58.
Charny, supra note 8, at 404.
Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1725, 1740-43; Charny, supra note 8, at 379.
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 541-46.

2003]

REGULA TION WITHOUT THE CODE

1597

cooperative dispositions were matched up in a case, they were able to
exchange information informally, without using formal discovery
devices.166
Similarly, one of the lawyers in the maritime personal-injury group
of my law firm reported that he would conduct discovery from the
plaintiff's attorney by calling up the other lawyer and saying, "Hey,
it's X-you know what I want on the A v. B case." The documents
(generally medical records and the like) would arrive the next day by
messenger. Significantly, the group of family law practitioners studied
by Gilson and Mnookin, and the maritime bar in Seattle were small; in
addition, divorces involving wealthy families and seaman's personal
injury cases are sufficiently idiosyncratic that they could be handled
effectively only by highly specialized lawyers. If these conditions are
satisfied, however, the result is a notable reduction in the transaction
costs associated with conducting litigation.
Unwritten codes of conduct or social norms can also reduce upfront costs by providing a way to bring the relationship between the
parties back to a cooperative footing, or deter uncooperative behavior
in the first place. Michael Reisman provides an example that is
familiar to litigators: A more experienced lawyer was bullying a
younger opponent in a deposition and the younger lawyer was unsure
how to respond.'67 The latter blurted out something which turned out
to be exactly the right form of words to stop the bully in his tracks.168
(Reisman does not say what the words were, but we can speculate.
Perhaps: "Mr. X, if you do not stop harassing the witness, I will have
no choice but to terminate this deposition and take the matter up with
the court.") The inadvertence in the story is amusing, but the more
general point is that there are incantations that one may utter to show
that one is willing to invoke legal or nonlegal sanctions. As Gilson
and Mnookin report, one experienced family lawyer faced by a
possible escalation in nastiness by opposing counsel simply said "en
garde."' 6 9 This can be an effective response, provided that there are
means of retaliation available, which lawyers can credibly threaten to
employ.
3.

Flexibility

As circumstances change, parties to a transaction may wish to
modify their relationship without going through the hassle of
renegotiating all aspects of the deal. In some industries, flexibility is
absolutely necessary because of rapid fluctuations in price, the
availability of materials or warehouse space, and so on. One of the
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 544.
Reisman, supra note 10, at 18.
Id.
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 553.
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cotton dealers interviewed by Bernstein summed up the response by
merchants to the volatility of the cotton market: "If someone is short
of warehouse space, you agree to delay delivery; if someone needs a
shipment early, you are ready to go, so you do it. ' 170 Even where the
parties had negotiated a legally enforceable agreement covering a
problem that arises, the parties may negotiate a solution as if there
never were a contract on point. 171 The reason for this is interesting-a
reputation for flexibility is essential for a party who wishes to enter
into transactions in the future. Thus, informal sanctions, such as loss
of reputation, may supplement formal (legal or nonlegal) methods of
ordering. As one of Macaulay's interviewees put it, "You don't read
legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do business
again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business
because one must behave decently.' ' 72 (Compare the idea that one
does not seek police protection when one's honor has been impugned,
but rather stands and fights.) Moreover, a person with a reputation
for flexibility enjoys the benefits of reciprocity-quite simply, other
people will cut you some slack if you have done so for them in the
past. In Bernstein's analysis, "even if transactors have to forego the
benefits of an occasional profitable breach in situations where
attempts to renegotiate fail, doing so is worthwhile so long as they can
count on their transacting partner to do the same when the shoe is on
1 73
the other foot."'
In some respects, litigation is like the cotton markets, in terms of
the volatility and unpredictability of daily events. Most lawyers do
not work only on one case at a time, so there is always a chance that a
different matter will suddenly heat up, requiring the lawyer to shift
attention away from other cases. Flexibility from opposing counsel is
critical here, because it is much less time-consuming simply to call up
the other lawyer for a schedule change, instead of seeking judicial
relief. Alternatively, circumstances may change by reason of newly
discovered evidence, a change in attitude of one of the clients, or
some other unexpected development beyond the control of the
lawyers. If the relationship between the two lawyers has been
proceeding on a cooperative footing, these changes can readily be
accommodated between the parties, with little hassle. In contrast, if
one of the lawyers has defected from the cooperative relationship, it
will be practically impossible for her to secure an inexpensive
accommodation to a schedule change. Note also that the opposing
lawyer will be better able than a tribunal to detect a pattern of abusive
170. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1744.
171. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 61.
172. Id.
173. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8,at 1756; see also Tebo, supra note 136, at 44
(reporting that lawyers in a small, close-knit community do not file motions for
default judgments, because "you know it's bound to happen to you sometime").
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requests for continuances or schedule changes, and can impose the
appropriate sanction, such as the new-found inflexibility in granting
procedural accommodations. Because the sanction would follow only
upon a recognized breach in the cooperative stance the parties had
been taking toward each other, it would be difficult to obtain similar
relief from the court. Essentially the party seeking a remedy would be
required to prove the nature of the parties' understandings and the
way in which the breaching lawyer's conduct deviated from those
expectations-an expensive undertaking, and one not likely to be
worth the effort.
III. How NONLEGAL AND INFORMAL SANCTIONS MIGHT WORK IN
CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE

When considering mechanisms as a basis for the control of lawyers,
it is important to differentiate two sources of potential sanctionsother lawyers, on the one hand, and judges or other authoritative
decisionmakers, on the other. Lawyers may often be able to impose a
sanction on their adversaries, by failing to agree to schedule changes,
retaliating with burdensome discovery requests, or filing motions at
inconvenient times, although none of these sanctions are legal, in the
sense of being backed up with judicial authority. Judges are of course
empowered to impose legal sanctions, but there is an important sense
7 4
in which the exercise of their power can sometimes be informal.
Judges often rely on the reputation of counsel or the history of dealing
with one of the lawyers when making discretionary judgments. If one
lawyer has appeared uncooperative, the judge may rule against her in
a discovery dispute, even though the judge would have been inclined
to grant a different lawyer a break.175 Although these sources of
174. Recall the legal/nonlegal and formal/informal distinctions. See supra note 113
and accompanying text.
175. This is the sort of statement that I know to be true, as a former litigator and
judicial clerk, but for which it is difficult to provide solid empirical "proof." For some
supporting evidence, see Keeton, supra note 142, at 4-5 (noting that acquiring a
reputation for sharp practice means that "even your more substantial contentions
come to be viewed with suspicion by judges familiar with your reputation"). See also
"The Rambo Litigator," The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 229 (1992) (the remarks of
Judge Marvin E. Aspen); Humbach, supra note 130, at 97 (anecdote); Nelson, supra
note 30, at 790 (recounting a judge's order that justified the result in part on the basis
of the judge's conclusion that "Mr. X engaged in a pattern of misconduct from the
opening statement through the closing argument"); Tebo, supra note 136, at 79
(reporting the account of a local judge who said he would sign anything on an oral
representation by a lawyer, but if he ever got in trouble for signing something, he
would never again trust that lawyer); R. Robin McDonald, 11th CircuitJudges Rap K
& S Over Discovery, Fulton County Daily Rep., Jan. 18, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News Group File (describing how, at oral argument, judges on 11th Circuit panel first
sharply criticized the defense lawyers' conduct of discovery, before considering merits
of appeal). In the context of business transactional lawyering, see Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 Yale L.J. 239
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sanctions differ, it is possible to make some generalizations about
informal and nonlegal sanctions that hold for both judges and lawyers.
A.

Bonds and Retaliation

David Charny's article on nonlegal sanctions contains an interesting
discussion of reputation bonds. One of the parties to a transaction
may enjoy a "relationship-specific prospective advantage" in dealing
with another. 7 6 For example, a one-shot relationship may not be that
valuable, but a long-term course of dealing might be quite profitable.
Alternatively, one party may require some flexibility from the other in
the future (such as delaying a shipment), and therefore is careful
herself to show flexibility, in order to build up a reservoir of
If A would benefit from dealing with B in the future, and
goodwill.'
B will deal with A only if A proves to be trustworthy, or if A might
need something (like flexibility) that B can give or deny at her
discretion, then B essentially controls a valuable asset of A. B can
"forfeit" the asset-the reputation bond-at any time by refusing to
deal with A in the future. The value of the bond is the value of the
future dealings with B. As Bernstein recognizes, the value of the
bond (and thus the incentive for A to continue cooperating) can be
increased tremendously by threatening A not only with the end of the
relationship with B, but also with that of other similarly situated
transactors, C through Z. For example, a diamond seller who is not a
member of the Diamond Dealers Club has greatly reduced access to
the worldwide diamond distribution network, and would therefore be
The value of the "bond" posted by
at a disadvantage in the market.'
a diamond seller is increased by the centrality of the Club to the
diamond market. Similarly, certain industry groups in the cotton
market can expel members for noncompliance with the association's
rules, which would result in economic catastrophe for the expelled
member.'7 9
Expulsion from an industry association is a more formal sanction
than B's refusal to deal with A, but, as Bernstein observes, there are
informal sanctions at work in these industries as well. For example,
the geographic concentration of cotton dealers on Front Street in
Memphis facilitates gossip, so that unethical conduct by one merchant
quickly becomes common knowledge in the relevant community.8
Gossip and a bad reputation can have a direct economic impact in the
(1984) (describing how parties to a transaction may be willing to accept the
representation of a lawyer with a good reputation, without doing duplicative
investigation).
176. Charny, supra note 8, at 392-94.
177. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 64.
178. Bernstein, Diamond,supra note 8, at 119-20.
179. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1737-39.
180. Id. at 1749-52.
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cotton industry. Banks, for instance, inquire into the reputation of
individual merchants and use that information to set interest rates or
decide whether to extend credit; other merchants can similarly refuse
to deal with an individual with a reputation for not paying debts
promptly, inflexibility, or unwillingness to comply with contractual
commitments."" Reputation is an extremely serious matter for
diamond dealers as well, for similar reasons, as banks rely on the
reputation of dealers when valuing collateral for loans.1 82 Indeed
reputation is taken so seriously that there are mechanisms for dealing
with false accusations and malicious gossip, such as a bulletin board in
the Club on which dealers can post rebuttals if they feel they have
been wrongfully victimized.183
There are a number of ways in which lawyers can make and enforce
"bonds" in civil litigation. As many observers have recognized,
adversary litigation is structured like an arms race or repeated
prisoner's dilemma. 4 Assuming the parties would prefer to keep
their costs down, and have small enough agency costs that they are
able to prevent their lawyers from "churning" the case to generate
billings, there are a number of junctures in litigation in which each
party would be better off adopting a cooperative stance with respect
to the other. For example, both parties would be better off if there
was some flexibility built into scheduling depositions and briefing
cycles, or by holding to informally agreed-upon understandings rather
than formalizing everything through the court.
Sufficiently
cooperative parties may even exchange information informally,
without resorting to formal discovery methods such as interrogatories
and requests for production." 5
If one party defects from the
cooperative solution, that defection will impose costs on the other and
(we may assume) result in benefits for the defecting party. The other
party will almost certainly retaliate, plunging the interaction into the
less efficient noncooperative solution. This is familiar from game
theory. As Robert Axelrod has shown, when dealing with opposing
counsel, the best strategy for lawyers to adopt is called "tit for tat"cooperate on the first move and continue to return cooperation for
cooperation on subsequent moves, but if the other party defects,
defect on the next move and all subsequent moves. 186 In fact, some
lawyers report that they employ exactly this strategy, feeling out their
adversaries for cooperativeness early in the process, for example by
181. Id. at 1745-48.
182. Bernstein, Diamond,supra note 8, at 154-55.
183. Id. at 121 n.10.
184. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 66-67 (1998) [hereinafter Simon,
Practice of Justice]; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 520; Setear, supra note 47, at
615-23.
185. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 544 (reporting that matrimonial lawyers
who trusted each other rarely used formal discovery).
186. Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation 16, 20-21 (1997).
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"experiment[ing] with minor agreements with opposing counsel early
in a case." ' 7

I have written elsewhere about the tit-for-tat practices surrounding
contention interrogatories.188 Suppose a case is framed by a complaint
and answer with dozens of contentions and responses, respectively. In
principle, each party could ask the other to provide all the factual
support for each averment or response-indeed, the other party has
an ethical duty under Rule 11 to conduct a reasonable investigation
into these facts, so it seems quite reasonable to make this information
discoverable. In practice, however, contention interrogatories are
annoying, time-consuming, and expensive. Moreover, because they
are easy to evade, litigators generally acknowledge that they produce
little useful information. For these reasons, their only function is as a
weapon. Both parties would be better off if neither side issued
contention interrogatories and generally neither side does, because
the adversary almost certainly has the capacity to retaliate in kind.
(An exception might be a case with a large, sophisticated firm against
a solo practitioner, particularly one inexperienced in federal court
practice; in such a case, contention interrogatories would be one way
of "snowing" the adversary under a blizzard of paper, forcing that
party to settle cheaply.) One way to characterize the retaliatory
service of contention interrogatories is as "additional abuse" which
further interferes with the discovery process,189 but an alternative
interpretation is that the possibility of retaliation actually deters the
abusive use of contention interrogatories in the first place.
There is a similar dynamic to other means that lawyers have for
annoying one another. A relationship between opposing lawyers on a
case may start out cooperatively, in several ways. Lawyers may accept
one another's oral representations at face value, without
memorializing them with confirmatory letters, because it is faster and
less expensive to rely on oral promises.1 9" If one party refuses to
honor an oral commitment, however, the future course of dealing
between the lawyers will be marked by exceeding attention to
formalities, and letters will follow on any phone call. (The purpose of
the letters is to make a record of the opposing party's bad faith, to lay
187. Nelson, supra note 30, at 776; see also Bartlett H. McGuire, Reflections of a
Recovering Litigator: Adversarial Excess in Civil Proceedings, 164 F.R.D. 283, 295
n.44 (1996).
188. Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation, supra note 49, at 2010 & nn.208-09. For judicial
decisions on the use of contention interrogatories, see, for example, Starcher v. Corr.
Med. Sys., Inc., 144 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998); Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v.
Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650-52 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
189. Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra note 37, at 250.
190. For a representative anecdote from a Charleston, S.C., lawyer, see Tebo, supra
note 136, at 44 ("Here, your word is your bond, and if you tell a fellow lawyer that
you're going to do something, nobody feels the need to put that in writing because
you know they will do what they say.").
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the groundwork for a future motion for relief from the court.)
Similarly, lawyers may cooperate in the sense that each side readily
grants requests for continuances, reschedules depositions, and makes
other minor procedural accommodations.
Each party knows,
however, that it may refuse to grant this permission at any time,
forcing the other side to approach the court for relief. Although the
court may theoretically sanction a lawyer for refusing to cooperate,'
in practice this hardly ever happens, because a reasonably clever
lawyer can always come up with a colorable reason for refusal: "That
witness had a scheduling conflict," "It was important to stick with the
briefing schedule because the motions cutoff deadline is
approaching," and so on. Few judges are inclined to second-guess
those sorts of reasons, at least in the absence of a pattern of bad faith
conduct by one of the lawyers, and will generally grant the requested
relief but not impose additional sanctions. Thus, lawyers can inflict
costs on one another by forcing their adversary to file a motion to
accomplish a simple change in schedule. Naturally, both sides have
this option, and a lawyer who decides to get nasty with the adversary
must anticipate that at some point in the case, the shoe will be on the
other foot. Reciprocity is the reason that lawyers generally refrain
from this kind of gratuitous nastiness, and this dynamic shows that
relationship-specific bonding does work well in practice to reduce
unethical behavior.
There are a few problems with the threat of retaliation as a means
of controlling lawyers. One is that it can be hard to decode
ambiguous actions as either aggressive or non-threatening. If the
parties are playing tit-for-tat, there is a risk that "one transactor will
misclassify an act of cooperation as an act of defection and thereby
trigger a series of defections and counter-defections that might well
lead to the unraveling of the ... relationship."'9 " Commercial norms
in the cotton industry ameliorate this problem in several ways. First,
there is a norm of restraint, and not assuming that a nonconforming
shipment is a deliberate breach, because "[i]t is widely recognized that
two cotton men acting in good faith may well grade a particular lot of
cotton differently."' 93 Also, owing to the wide variation in cotton
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). A lawyer is also technically subject to discipline
under Model Rule 3.2, but absent extraordinary circumstances, lawyers are hardly
ever disciplined for violation of this rule alone. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.2
(2002). The disciplinary cases cited in the annotations to this rule generally involve
lawyers who. neglect to work on their clients' cases for an extended period of time. See
A.B.A., Annotated Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct 307-10 (4th ed. 1999). Sanctions
imposed on lawyers for delaying litigation are generally grounded in a rule of civil
procedure of the court's inherent power, not Rule 3.2, although courts may refer to
the disciplinary rule as an additional norm that reinforces their authority. See id.
192. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1771; see also Gilson & Mnookin, supra
note 7, at 522 ("In litigation, there are many gray tones between the black and white
of [cooperation or defection].").
193. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1774.
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quality due to conditions in transit and storage, cotton merchants tend
to pay attention to patterns rather than individual acts, so that one
saves up retaliation until a "pattern of frequent bad outcomes leads a
transactor to conclude that he is dealing with a defector."' 94 In
addition, because retaliation imposes costs on the retaliator, it may be
inefficient to exact a "tit" for every minor "tat." Rather, being
forgiving for a while and then dropping the hammer on a defector
95
tends to be the efficient strategy for cotton merchants.
One way of retaliating for repeated acts of cooperation would be
for the aggrieved client to switch lawyers or law firms, from a
cooperator to a notorious "gladiator" or Rambo litigator.1'9 (I would
venture that most lawyers could identify this lawyer or law firm in the
market in which they practice.) This is a drastic and very expensive
response for the client, however, because of the costs associated with
getting the new lawyer up to speed on the case.'97 Thus, the client
may put pressure on the existing lawyer to become a gladiator, despite
the lawyer's preference to cooperate, and investment in her
reputation as a cooperator. 9 ' Whether the client can insist that the
lawyer retaliate is an interesting question of professional
responsibility law. Briefly, the Model Rules allocate authority to
make decisions respecting litigation on the basis of a distinction
between ends and means-the client has the right to make decisions
concerning the "objectives of representation," and the lawyer
essentially has the right to select the means by which these objectives
will be carried out, although she is obligated to consult with the client
about tactical decisions. 99 This distinction has never been very
helpful, and even the comment to the 1983 version of Rule 1.2(a)
admits that a "clear distinction between objectives and means
sometimes cannot be drawn, ' 21() but the commentary to the revised
version of Rule 1.2 does define "means" as equivalent to "tactical,
legal, or technical matters. ' 2"' The difficulty is that some tactical or
legal decisions, such as foregoing a claim or defense, or refraining
from putting on a witness at trial, can make all the difference to the
outcome of the case. Should the subject matter of these decisions be
characterized as means or ends? In functional terms they are ends,
but formally they are means. The Restatement opts for the functional
approach, vesting the client with authority over decisions that are
similar in significance to accepting an offer of settlement, stipulating
194. Id. at 1775.
195. See id. at 1778-79.
196. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 523, 556-58.
197. Id. at 524.
198. Id. at 551-53.
199. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (1983).
200. Id., cmt. 1.
201. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt 2 (2002).
"Ethics 2000" version of the Rules.

This is the so-called
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to a claim or defense, or pursuing an appeal. °2 If the decision to
resort to "Rambo" tactics could make the difference between winning
or losing a case, the client may have a legal right to make it.
B.

Gossip

Bonds work well in repeated interactions, where one party stands to
lose a relationship-specific prospective advantage, resulting from the
privilege of dealing with the other or the efficiencies of a trusting
relationship. They are not much use in one-shot interactions, where
the parties do not expect to deal with one another in the future. One
of the transactors can defect from the cooperative solution, and the
aggrieved party will just have to accept the loss, and will be unable to
retaliate against the breaching party within the confines of the
bilateral relationship. The aggrieved party does have a means to
retaliate, however, if the defecting party is a member of the same
relatively small community-namely, "putting the word out on the
street" that he has been victimized, so that others in the community
will be more cautious in dealing with the defector in the future.
Because the defector probably values relationships with other lawyers
that are characterized by trust (so that, for example, his oral
representations are believed, and not confirmed by follow-up letters),
informality, flexibility in scheduling, and tolerance for occasional
mistakes, rather than exploiting them, the lawyer who was the
aggressor in the earlier relationship will lose a thing of value in a
subsequent relationship. Thus, the threat of adverse gossip can serve
to control uncooperative behavior in a one-shot relationship, where
relationship-specific bonding would not be effective. Lawyers in small
communities tend to internalize the threat of adverse gossip, and
many junior lawyers have heard advice from more experienced
you would
practitioners along the lines of, "Don't say or do anything
20 3
be embarrassed to see reported in the newspaper.
To return momentarily to our backward-looking perspective, many
cultures governed by the ethics of honor recognize a formalized
gossiping practice, called "posting," in which dishonorable conduct by
a member of the community may be announced publicly. For
example, in Bedouin society, "the dishonor of a man who defaulted
after pledging his honor might be marked by the propagation of a
defamatory text accompanied by an appropriate picture. "204 Others in
the community would thus be on notice not to accept pledges from the
202. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 22 (2000).
203. See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 136, at 43. It is perhaps a measure of the cynicism
of large-firm lawyers, or the more aggressive atmosphere of personal-injury litigation,
that I heard a somewhat different version of that advice as a junior associate: "Don't
say or do anything that you wouldn't want to see reported to the judge in an affidavit
in support of a motion for sanctions."
204. Stewart, supra note 14, at 119.
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posted individual in the future. In the American South, failure to
accept a challenge to a duel or dishonorable conduct in the
negotiations leading up to a duel or in the duel itself could be dealt
with by posting."" An example of the colorful language used in posts
comes from a dispute between two prominent Virginia politicians in
1807, which culminated in one of the parties putting up handbills on
all street corners in Washington reading: "In justice to my character I
denounce to the world John Randolph, a member of Congress, as a
2 °6
prevaricating, base, calumniating scoundrel, poltroon and coward.
After being posted, a man was no longer deemed a gentleman, and
others could ignore his insults or challenges to duel. Similarly, in
some professional communities, acquiring a sufficiently poor
reputation can result in the ostracism of the offending member, as in
the diamond industry where the public posting of reports of contractbreaking can result in the effective expulsion of the offender from the
industry."0 7
Remarkably enough, the posting phenomenon has not passed from
our public life, and occasionally surfaces in the legal profession. A
recent press release by a major law firm may be understood as a
modern example of posting. After Latham & Watkins poached a
corporate securities partner, Frode Jensen, from Pillsbury Winthrop,
Pillsbury issued a remarkably intemperate public statement accusing
the lawyer of sexual harassment and laziness, which are ritualistic
accusations of dishonor to a modern lawyer, just as surely as
allegations of dishonesty and cowardice were to a gentleman in the
nineteenth century:
[A]s a result of Latham's press release [announcing the hiring,]
Pillsbury Winthrop Chair, Mary Cranston, explained that Mr.
Jensen's departure comes on the heels of sexual harassment
allegations involving Mr. Jensen and a significant decline in his
productivity.
...
We

investigated the harassment claims, concluded that there was
a reasonable likelihood that harassment had occurred and
responded with a variety of measures.
...Latham & Watkins did not contact anyone in Pillsbury
Winthrop's management in connection with a reference check for
Mr. Jensen. "s
205. Freeman, supra note 14, at 121-23, 172-73.
206. Yarn, supra note 77, at 90-91.
207. See Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8, at 130-32. Expulsion may also be
formal, although still nonlegal, by virtue of the operation of a private legal system. In
the cotton industry, for example, trade associations expel members for
noncompliance with arbitration awards, and it is necessary to belong to the
association in order to do business with other members. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note
8, at 1738-39.
208. Otis Bilodeau & Jennifer Myers, Pillsbury Winthrop's War of Words, Legal
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Like a traditional posting in an honor culture, the press release is
aimed directly at the lawyer's reputation for integrity, and also
appears to be designed to steer potential clients away from the rival
law firm, thus striking at the confluence of the person's personal and
public selves. 20 9 Also, like a posting, the press release brims with such
inflammatory language that it invites a response from Latham &
Watkins and Jensen, lest those lawyers be taken as outside of the
company of gentlemen and gentlewomen. ("Sexual harasser" is
probably equivalent to "poltroon" in modern discourse.)
Alternatively, as Joanne Freeman has shown in her study of similar
wars of words in the founding period, it may turn out that Pillsbury
miscalculated its strategy and may itself lose honor. 21' The jury is still
out, so to speak, on the Latham versus Pillsbury episode, and much
depends on the reactions by peer firms and elite clients in the financial
community. 21' In an honor-governed community, attacks and parries
in duels of words are always enacted in public, and the prevailing
party is anointed as such by public acclamation.
The critical prerequisite for the effectiveness of gossip as a means of
social control is a small, relatively close-knit community, so that
information about previous breaches is transmitted relatively
inexpensively to others who may deal with the defector in the future.
If it becomes too expensive or difficult to acquire this information,
parties may just take their chances, and the defector will find new
partners willing to extend courtesies and to cooperate, instead of
imposing expensive procedural formalities at the outset of a
relationship. If the defector is so inclined, she can exploit this
cooperation and move on to the next victim. This seems to be the
modus operandiof Wal-Mart, which has been sanctioned in numerous
courts for discovery abuse. 212 Apparently Wal-Mart has a pattern of
withholding internal memoranda on parking lot security in premisesTimes, Sept. 9, 2002, at 10 (quoting Pillsbury Winthrop press release).
209. The diatribe was apparently motivated by another consideration familiar in
honor cultures-loss of status. See Anthony Lin, Jensen Drops Plans to Move to
Latham, 228 N.Y. L.J. 53, Sept. 17, 2002, at 1. Pillsbury felt that it had to respond
because the news of the loss of a prominent mergers and acquisitions partner might
hurt its ability to recruit in the senior lateral market for lawyers. See id.
210. Freeman, supra note 14, at 119. Alexander Hamilton's pamphlet attack on
John Adams overreached, sounded more like a rant or a "vindictive personal assault"
than a proper defense of Hamilton's character, and therefore harmed Hamilton's
reputation, not Adams's. Id.
211. Preliminary indications are that the Pillsbury posting prompted Latham and
Jenkins to call off the move. See Lin, supra note 209. Reading between the lines, it
seems that Latham did not want to endure the adverse publicity associated with hiring
an allegedly lazy sexual harasser. Jenkins is reportedly consulting with attorneys, and
a defamation lawsuit appears all but inevitable.
212. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, Wal-Mart Evidence Suit Allowed: Woman Claims
Retailer Destroyed Evidence, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A5; Bob Van Voris, WalMart Had Memo on Risks to Shoppers: It Wasn't Disclosed in a Suit Over Rape, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 3-10, 2001, at Al.
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liability litigation. Although individual judges can become enraged
when they learn of this practice, the information does not always get
transmitted to other courts, and Wal-Mart is able to successfully
withhold the information from ignorant plaintiffs. For this reason, the
national scope of the market for legal services tends to destroy the
effectiveness of gossip networks as a means for controlling unethical
behavior by lawyers." 3
One interesting suggestion of Bernstein's, though, is that it may be
possible to employ "formal methods for transmitting reputation
information, 21 4 to harness the power of gossip networks even in
larger-scale, less personalized markets. Sometimes this can be simple
and dramatic, as this story from a professional responsibility casebook
shows: An Oklahoma lawyer breached an oral promise to modify a
discovery schedule, and when he realized he could create trouble for
his adversary, insisted on holding to the written schedule.2" 5 The other
lawyer made a motion to modify the schedule, which was denied,
because of a local rule providing that any schedule changes had to be
in writing.2" 6 At the conclusion of the motion hearing, however, the
judge asked the winning lawyer (the defector) to turn and face the
courtroom, which was crowded with other lawyers waiting to argue
motions.2 7 After the bailiff got the crowd's attention, the judge
announced,
"1 just want everyone to know how Mr. X practices law. He orally
agreed to postpone certain discovery matters, but now is before this
court arguing that his word is not enforceable because the
agreement wasn't in writing as required by the local court rules.
Take a good look at218 him now so you will know who you are dealing
with in the future."

The Pillsbury Winthrop "posting" described above is a similar
event,2" enacted on a larger stage. The press release attempts to
broaden the scope of the effective gossip network to potential clients
and other lawyers outside the immediate community of lawyers to
which Mr. Jensen belongs. An occasional, high-profile (the incident

213. Perhaps I am being too pessimistic about the effectiveness of gossip in a
national market. Wal-Mart has apparently begun to shift its litigation strategy from
an adamant refusal to be cooperative with plaintiffs to a more conciliatory approach.
Part of the catalyst for this change was "widespread negative publicity for its hardnosed litigation style." Catherine Aman, Wal-Mart's Change of Heart, Corp. Couns.,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 16.
214. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1752.
215. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Teresa S. Collett, Cases and Materials on the Rules
of the Legal Profession 188 (1996). 1 have cited this story previously. Wendel,
Nonlegal Regulation, supra note 49, at 1986 n.11 7.
216. Cochran & Collett, supra note 215, at 188.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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was mentioned in the New York Times22") statement may have the
effect of spreading widely the news of an egregious breach of
professional norms, but this mechanism is inadequate to deal with
more quotidian transgressions. It is inconceivable that routine ethical
breaches, such as reneging on a scheduling agreement or providing
evasive discovery responses, could be the subject of a public
broadside. For one thing, the audience for press releases would
quickly become insensitive to them, as lawyers issued public charges
and denials over minor squabbles. Gossip that is ignored is not an
effective nonlegal sanction. Another problem is that if the audience is
too large, gossip loses its connection with concrete action against the
offending lawyer. What, for example, am I supposed to do about Mr.
Jensen? Thus, it is generally only in smaller, close-knit communities
that we would expect to find flourishing gossip networks as a means
for controlling lawyers.
Moreover, the gossip networks I have just described are those in
which the participants are lawyers. Because a significant function of
norms of professional ethics is to protect the interests of clients, we
may be skeptical about the effectiveness of gossip as a substitute for
other means of enforcing the rights of clients. Particularly in the case
of individuals who are not sophisticated consumers of legal resources,
or repeat players with respect to the litigation system, it is difficult to
transmit sufficient information to the population of prospective clients
" ' Even entity clients with
to affect their hiring of counsel.22
in-house
legal staff may not be able to learn reputation-specific information
about lawyers in local legal communities scattered throughout the
country. A great deal depends on context. If the prospective clients
and lawyers are part of the same social circles, clients can probably
pick up on adverse gossip and refuse to hire a lawyer who has become
a professional pariah. This situation is probably limited to relatively
small towns or subcommunities that are defined by a particular
industry, as in Bernstein's example of all the players in the cotton
industry who gather in a district of Memphis. Perhaps one of the
functions of the civic organizations studied by Robert Putnam,222 in
addition to creating stores of "social capital," is to facilitate the
transmission of negative gossip and positive information about the
behavior of economic actors. If this is so, we can add the erosion of
information-sharing networks to Putnam's list of negative
consequences of the decline of participation in these activities.
To the extent we believe that informal transmission of reputational
information is an effective way to regulate, the challenge is how to
220. Jonathan D. Glater & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bitter Exchange by Law Firms
Over the Hiring of a Lawyer, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2002, at C2.
221. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974).
222. Putnam, supra note 6.
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increase the information-sharing ability of participants in the market
for legal services. It is not as daunting as the project of rehabilitating
social structures that facilitate civic engagement- "restor[ing]
American community for the twenty-first century" 22 -which is the
task to which Putnam has set himself. The reason is that some of the
structures for sharing information may already be in place. For
instance, an active trade press reporting on an industry can be an
extremely valuable asset for nonlegal regulation.2 24 The American
Lawyer, for example, reports on ethically questionable practices that
harm clients, such as adding surcharges to billings for expenses like
photocopying and the use of fax machines,225 and conducting abusive
discovery.226 The magazine is widely read by in-house lawyers, who
can take these reports into account when they hire outside counsel.
Regional or industry-specific publications perform a similar function
in various subcommunities.227 Professionals and client representatives
also attend trade fairs and conferences at which they informally
exchange information, and social ties built up through these
interactions facilitate gossip networks.228
Some industries have experimented with larger-scale social
planning in order to create a community that more effectively
regulates its members. In the cotton industry, the trade association
sponsors debutante balls, an annual civic cotton carnival, golf
tournaments, a domino tournament, and annual conventions that are
designed to be family events.229 Similarly, the Diamond Dealers Club
provides kosher restaurants for its members, a Jewish health
organization to provide emergency services, a synagogue on the
premises, and even group-travel discounts so that members' families
can vacation together when the bourse is closed.23
In the legal
profession, the closest analogue is probably the American Inns of
Court movement, which aims to bring practitioners and judges
together, along with law students and academics, to discuss real-world
223. Id. at 403.
224. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1753.
225. Susan Beck & Michael Orey, Skaddenomics: The Ludicrous World of Law
Firm Billing, Am. Law., Sept. 1991, at 3.
226. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, Am. Law., Apr. 1994, at 5.
227. See, e.g., Bernstein, Diamond,supra note 8, at 144. Most cities or regions have
a newspaper or magazine like the Puget Sound Business Journal in Seattle that
reports on local businesses and professional firms such as accountants and lawyers. In
my experience, lawyers worry about adverse publicity in these journals, because they
believe that in-house lawyers at clients and prospective clients read them carefully.
The managing partner of the law firm mentioned in one article specifically addressed
concerns that "opposing counsel, and perhaps even some judges, [might come] to
mistrust Bogle attorneys in similar situations." Alex P. Fryer, Dismaying Discovery:
Sanctioned Again, Bogle Says It's Taking Steps to Keep the Courts Satisfied, Puget
Sound Bus. J., Nov. 17-23, at 1.
228. Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 64.
229. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1750-51.
230. Bernstein, Diamond, supra note 8, at 139-40.
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issues that arise in legal practice. 231 Although not explicitly stated as a
goal of the organization, the meetings probably also serve to transmit
positive and negative information about the reputation of local
lawyers and judges. Local bar associations frequently sponsor lunches
and banquets that also facilitate social ties.
One specific prescriptive conclusion that flows from the importance
of information-sharing is that lawyers must have enough time to
develop social bonds with others. This is a major conclusion of
Robert Putnam's work on social capital. He challenges employers:
"Let us find ways to ensure that by 2010 America's workplace will be
substantially more family-friendly and community-congenial, so that
American workers will be enabled to replenish our stocks of social
capital both within and outside the workplace. ' 232 Replace "replenish
stocks of social capital" with "develop useful ties with other
professionals and clients in the relevant markets," and this passage
can serve as a prescription for law firms to create more humane
working environments for lawyers. Anthony Kronman, among others,
has pointed out the ways in which pressure to bill unreasonable hours
contributes to the atrophy of the faculty of professional judgmentlawyers who do not have time to develop broader interests, to read
widely, experience art, cultivate civic and community ties, and build
friendships and family relationships have less of a storehouse of
experience and wisdom from which to draw in ethical reasoning.233
Even if one does not accept Kronman's Aristotelian conception of
ethics, Putnam's point is that community activities and a network of
social relationships are instrumentally useful to preserving certain
social goods. Quite apart from affecting the ability of individual
practitioners to acquire virtue (Kronman's concern), onerous billablehour requirements may interfere with the ability of lawyers to develop
social networks that facilitate the transmission of information about
one another's character and actions.
The alternative to strengthening social bonds is to rely on "formal
methods for transmitting reputation information. '234 This sounds
paradoxical, but it is only one step removed from encouraging a
flourishing trade press, for instance. The example mentioned above,
where the judge chewed out a lawyer in front of the gallery of lawyers
waiting for their cases to be called on civil motions calendar, is an
excellent example of transmitting reputation information through
231. The organization's website states: "An American Inn of Court is an amalgam
of judges, lawyers, and in some cases, law professors and law students. Each Inn
meets approximately once a month both to 'break bread' and to hold programs and
discussions on matters of ethics, skills and professionalism." General Information, at
http://www.innsofcourt.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2002).
232. Putnam, supra note 6, at 406.
233. Kronman, supra note 21, at 295-307.
234. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1752.
235. See supra text accompanying note 209.
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what are otherwise formal channels. It would be useful if judges
would do more of this. I know from serving as a law clerk that there
are cases in which the lawyers had damaged their credibility and
affected the judge's willingness to accept their representations in the
briefs. (It was my job as a law clerk to comb the record to see if the
lawyers were exaggerating or summarizing the record fairly.)
Unfortunately, these judicial impressions seldom make it into written
opinions, so there are few observable traces of the effect of a poor
reputation on the success of a lawyer's advocacy.236 I do not know
what accounts for the judicial reluctance to expose unethical conduct
by lawyers. Perhaps judges are worried about being reversed or
subjected to recusal motions. Remember that evaluations of unethical
conduct tend to appear subjective, because they are so influenced by
contextual factors. Judges do not want to appear to act arbitrarily,
and the "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" nature of the ethical evaluation
here may cause judges to be reluctant to try to elaborate on the
reasons for their reactions. In the absence of some good reason for
reticence, however, judges who are motivated to rule against a lawyer
because of the lawyer's unprofessional conduct owe it to the bar to
point out the conduct and its consequences in opinions and orders.
In business, the best known formal means for sharing information
about a party's history of cooperation is the credit agency, such as
Dun and Bradstreet. There are highly specialized examples of
information-sharing agencies in certain industries, such as trade
associations in the cotton industry that serve as a clearinghouse for
information pertaining to "the moral integrity, ability to judge cotton,
or financial responsibility of any cotton firm or commission buyer in
'
the cotton belt."237
Many lawyers would recoil from the idea of a
moral-integrity credit agency, perhaps finding the concept a bit too
Big Brother-ish for their tastes. Some have proposed a related
concept, however-strengthening voluntary associations whose
membership requirements serve, in effect, as a guarantee of the
probity of members. The fact of membership in one of these
organizations thus serves as a signal to potential transaction partners,
a game theory concept which is addressed in the next subsection.
C.

Signaling

If adversary litigation-either in general or in a particular casecannot be modeled as a repeated game, but is rather a one-shot

236. For a rare, but hopeful exception, see John Council, Provost Umphrey Pulls
Appeal After Harsh 5th Circuit Memo, 18 Tex. Law. 30 (2002) (describing how
appellate panel sent memo to court clerk advising law firm that, if it did not submit
substitute briefs free of factual misstatements, misleading omissions, and out-ofcontext quotations, the lawyers would be subject to various possible sanctions).
237. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1752.
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prisoner's dilemma, 23' bonding will not be an effective means to
ensure cooperation among the lawyers. A lawyer can defect on round
one (the only round) and not face retaliation from her adversary on
the next iteration. Gossip and threatening the reputation of one's
adversary is a possible response. The aggrieved adversary can spread
the word of the uncooperative disposition of the offending lawyer,
harming the lawyer's ability to function effectively in future cases.
Ideally, though, we would like to use nonlegal methods to ensure
cooperation from the outset, rather than only responding after the fact
to breaches of professional norms. Cooperative lawyers should enjoy
an advantage in their dealings with opposing counsel, because
adversaries would rather interact with cooperative lawyers than those
who are willing to defect from the mutually beneficial solution. In
game theory terms, assuming a market is small and sufficiently free of
noise, lawyers can take actions that function as a signal to a potential
Strangers who are considering transacting with one
adversary.
another can use costly actions to prove to each other that they are
willing to make investments of resources with a short-term cost, in
order to achieve the benefits of a long-term cooperative relationship.
Signaling is required when each party would like to know whether
the other is inclined to cooperate. 23 9 Because "talk is cheap" and
parties can costlessly promise the sun, the moon, and the stars, it is
impossible simply to reassure the other of one's disposition to
cooperate. If one of the parties could take a costly action that
revealed a cooperative disposition, however, then observers could be
assured that the party would not defect from the cooperative solution
to the prisoner's dilemma.24 The adversaries of lawyers who are
known to be cooperative would start out the relationship on a
cooperative footing; conversely, anyone dealing with a notorious
defector would start out cautiously and defensively, to avoid the risk
of having her own cooperation exploited.2 41 For example, William
McLucas, the former head of the enforcement division of the SEC and
now a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, is widely known as
tough on corporate fraud; "calling in Wilmer" is therefore a signal
that a corporation is serious about investigating wrongdoing because it
is costly-it deprives the client of the opportunity to stall, evade, and
play games to resist a government investigation of suspected fraud.242
Once a client has taken this costly step, others who deal with it (such
238. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 521-22.
239. See generally Douglas G. Baird, et al., Game Theory and the Law 122-42
(1994); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms:
Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperationin Institutions, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev.
423 (2002).
240. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000).
241. Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 9, at 64.
242. See Otis Bilodeau, What Happened to Mark Belnick?, Legal Times, Sept. 16,
2002, at 1.
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as government investigators) are likely to be more cooperative, for
example by accepting factual representations at face value without
requiring expensive "due diligence" to supply corroborating evidence.
William Simon is one important scholar of the legal profession who
is attracted to the idea of signaling. In particular, he suggests signaling
through the act of joining voluntary associations or law firms with a
reputation for probity-"high commitment" to ethics, as he calls it.243
The act of associating oneself with one of these organizations is costly,
because it deprives the lawyer of the opportunity to defect
opportunistically. A lawyer would be willing to bear this cost,
however, because it would result in a greater long-run gain, as a result
of the lawyer's ability to attract clients who are looking for highcommitment lawyers. Although lawyers sometimes assume that all
clients are seeking attack-dog advocates, many clients do recognize
the value of being represented by a lawyer who is known as a
cooperator-namely, the additional credibility before courts and third
parties that the lawyer enjoys, which results in less expense for the
client and a greater likelihood of favorable judicial decisions where
the judge has discretion in how to rule. The problem is that if there
are enough of these clients out there, a low-commitment lawyer may
be able to mimic the actions taken by high-commitment lawyers and
thus attract away that lawyer's clients. An action is effective as a
signal of one's commitment level only if it is sufficiently costly in the
short-run that only genuinely high-commitment lawyers would be
willing to incur it.
Summarizing criticism I have offered in greater detail elsewhere,244
there are a couple of reasons why signaling mechanisms may not
enable clients seeking high-commitment lawyers to retain only those
lawyers, and not low-commitment lawyers. One is that law firms tend
not to have monolithic reputations. With respect to any given firm,
some opposing lawyers regard it as full of unethical or lowcommitment lawyers, and some perceive it as high-commitment.2 45
The situation is even worse for voluntary organizations; the Gilson
and Mnookin study of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers, for example, revealed that there were both high- and lowcommitment lawyers within the organization.2 46 The other lawyers
know the commitment levels of their peers, but outsiders-that is,
potential clients-cannot use the fact of Academy membership as a
243. William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar? Professionalism Without Monopoly,
30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003). Posner refers to individuals in this category
as "good types" who, on his definition, have a low discount rate. Posner, supra note
240, at 19-22. That means they are more willing to defer short-term gains in the
interests of long-run benefits that flow from cooperation. Id.
244. W. Bradley Wendel, Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on Simon's
Ladd Lecture, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
245. Nelson, supra note 30, at 796-97.
246. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 556-58.

2003]

REGULATION WITHOUT THE CODE

1615

guarantee that any particular lawyer has a high level of commitment
to a cooperative style of dealing.24 7 If the organization were willing to
expel the low-commitment lawyers, on the other hand, membership
would have some meaning. The second problem with signaling is that
there is too much variability in the way certain actions should be
interpreted. Just as there is good-faith disagreement over whether
deception in negotiation is "ungentlemanly" or "tactics," and whether
surreptitious taping of phone conversations is dishonorable or
legitimate, 2481xpc
we may expect similar disagreement over whether one of
these actions will be regarded as defection from the cooperative
relationship between the parties. The result is a great deal of "noise"
in the marketplace, which interferes with the signaling mechanism.
As Gilson and Mnookin observe:
Noise is the enemy of cooperative strategies. The more difficult it is
to tell whether one's opponent is cooperating, the more likely it is
that mistakes will occur, leading to unnecessary conflict. At the
extreme, mistaking cooperation for defection a single time can result
in eternal conflict between tit-for-tat players. We hypothesize that
as litigation grows more complex the parties are less likely to
understand fully their own and their opponent's interests, and as a
result, their opponent's actions will grow noisier. 249Noise, in turn,
leads to misunderstanding and unnecessary conflict.
The problem would be even worse for episodic participants in the
litigation system, who are not as adept at interpreting others' actions
as either cooperation or defection. Because repeat players are already
protected to some degree through bonding mechanisms, signaling
seems either redundant (for those litigants) or ineffectual because of
the problem of noise.
The other problem with permitting any group, either a voluntary
association or a quasi-state actor such as a bar association, to screen
out applicants on the basis of character is that the screening process
may be used to exclude unpopular applicants, with "ethics" or
"character" being used as the rationale for exclusion. The best known
example of this process at work is the misuse of character and fitness
requirements to deny suspected Communists admission to the
profession in the 1940s and 1950.25') The present-day analogue might
be attempts to discipline lawyers for alleging racial bias by courts. In
247. Simon acknowledges that this variability diminishes the value of membership
as a signal. See Simon, Practice of Justice, supra note 184, at 213-14.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
249. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 7, at 548.
250. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential, 94 Yale
L.J. 491 (1985). For the Supreme Court's response to these character-and-fitness
inquiries, see Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971); see also Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401
U.S. 23 (1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs of N. M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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one case, an African-American lawyer was punished for referring to a
trial judge as "either... completely incapable of recalling significant
facts, or... an unmitigated liar."2 5'
The federal district court
abstained from the Virginia disciplinary proceedings,252 but it is
reasonable to wonder whether the sanctions order was motivated in
part by the lawyer's "race and professional style," '5 3 rather than
generally applicable principles of professionalism. It is telling that the
bar committee that investigated the lawyer's conduct kept an
"extensive file" containing information about matters not related to
the conduct at issue,254 recalling the dossiers assembled by J. Edgar
Hoover's FBI. In a similar case, although a court ultimately refused
to impose discipline, the Oklahoma Bar Association attempted to
punish a black lawyer who had called a trial judge a racist.255 Finally,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed sanctions against a lawyer who had
accused opposing counsel of being a racist bigot.256
Whatever the merits of the allegations of racism, the lawyers
involved in these cases potentially face the full panoply of informal
sanctions-distrust by opposing counsel and judges, exclusion from
referral networks, and so on-on the basis of being deemed unethical
because of making an inflammatory charge against a judge or
opposing lawyer. The unpopularity of a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or
the position asserted by the lawyer increases the risk that a judge or
litigation adversary will perceive an action as unprofessional and
deserving of some kind of nonlegal sanction. To put it in game-theory
terms, opponents may regard this conduct as a defection from
expected norms of cooperation, and respond with some kind of
retaliatory measure, even though the underlying charge may be
warranted.
IV.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL REGULATION

I am not suggesting that we turn back the clock to a time in which
legal regulation of the discovery process was completely absent.
Nonlegal sanctions are not sufficient by themselves to ensure that the
system functions effectively. The history of the legal regulation of
pretrial litigation is not uniformly bleak, and in some respects
discovery is more efficient than it was before the extensive
legalization of the process.257 It would be naive in the extreme to
believe that the problem of discovery abuse will go away if
communities of lawyers are simply left to their own devices to control
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Greene v. Va. State Bar Ass'n, 411 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Va. 1976).
See id. at 517 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
Id. at 516.
Id. at 517.
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988).
Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002).
Beckerman, supra note 37, at 560-61.
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unethical behavior. For one thing, there are obstacles to the nonlegal
regulation of the profession in many instances. As noted above,
nonlegal regulation works best in small, close-knit communities in
which lawyers are likely to be repeat-players with respect to each
The trend toward an
other and the population of clients.258
increasingly national, and even global, legal practice is moving
contrary to the direction that would bolster the capacity of local legal
Even
communities to control misbehavior by their members.
seemingly technical issues, such as the permissibility of
multijurisdictional practice by lawyers, have implications for the
efficacy of nonlegal sanctions. Although many commentators decry
strict state enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes as
parochialism and featherbedding by in-state lawyers, local licensing
does tend to encourage lawyers to practice within a geographically
limited area, which tends to enhance information-sharing and
nonlegal sanctioning.
It is also important not to become too "warm and cuddly '2 9 about
the concept of a self-regulating professional community. Debutante
balls and cotton carnivals 26 ° are nice if you are allowed in the door, but
small societies and communities such as the Memphis cotton dealers
can be unwelcoming, or downright hostile to outsiders. The ABA
Journal'sarticle on the civility and decency of Charleston lawyers only
obliquely acknowledged the famously clubby atmosphere of the legal
community, with its references to the Old Guard and "out-oftowners. '26 1 The magazine featured an African-American lawyer on
the cover, but one wonders how willing the community was to
embrace the prospect of an integrated bar. Although it was certainly
not unique in this respect, the elite of Charleston society closed ranks
against attempts by African-Americans to achieve equality in the
1940s, and ostracized a federal district court judge, a former member
of the social A-list, who ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a civil rights
case.26 2 To put it bluntly, there is no guarantee that a community's
norms that are enforced by nonlegal sanctions are morally attractive
ones. Lawyers in small communities often report that they are more
concerned with appeasing powerful institutional actors in that
community, not necessarily with being as effective on behalf of their
clients as they could be.263 Undoubtedly this is a good thing in some
258. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
259. Putnam, supra note 6, at 21.
260. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 8, at 1750-51.
261. Tebo, supra note 136, at 79. I base my characterization of the Charleston legal
community on the reports of many of my law students who have worked there for the
summer, and also on general "grapevine" reports about the practice environment of
many cities in the region.
262. See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of
Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality 298-301 (1975).
263. Donald Landon, Country Lawyers: The Impact of Context on Professional
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cases. Everyone, including clients, would be better off if opposing
lawyers got along well and refrained from discovery abuse and
wasteful litigation. There are times, however, when a lawyer's job is
to use every means at her disposal on behalf of her client, even if that
means angering opposing counsel and the court. Overuse of nonlegal
sanctions might chill effective advocacy just as surely as the overly
enthusiastic use of Rule 11 sanctions was believed to have a
disproportionate impact on certain categories of unpopular litigants
such as prisoners.
Legal and nonlegal sanctions have their own peculiar pathologies.
Legal sanctions can be cumbersome, expensive to invoke, and timeconsuming. It can be difficult to specify in advance all of the
circumstances that justify sanctions, and violations of legal sanctions
can be difficult to verify before a third-party decisionmaker. Legal
sanctions are susceptible to gaming and abuse by knowledgeable
lawyers. They are also vulnerable to institutional breakdowns caused
by common conditions such as clogged dockets and overworked
judges. At the same time, nonlegal sanctions are dependent upon the
prevailing norms of the community, which may or may not be the
norms we would like to see incorporated into a regime of professional
regulation. Nonlegal sanctions tend not to exhibit the rule-of-law
virtues such as predictability, impartiality, and ascertainability. Even
though most lawyers know the difference between "hardball" and
decent but aggressive advocacy, a statute that prohibited hardball
would almost certainly be held void for vagueness. The reasons for
this are understandable-the rules of the game should be known in
advance, and applied fairly, without regard to the identity of the
parties, and courts worry a great deal about the potential for abuse of
vague statutes. Nonlegal sanctions rely on the community to police
itself, but if the community becomes too much like a club, then
lawyers can find themselves blackballed for angering powerful
members of that club; this result is antithetical to the rule of law.
For this reason, it is impossible to draw a neat bottom-line
conclusion in favor of, or against, nonlegal sanctions. Like the
evaluation of the activities they regulate, the evaluation of nonlegal
sanctions proceeds on a case-by-case basis. The lesson of "looking
back," however, is that the alternative to extensive legal regulation of
the profession is not nothing, but nonlegal regulation. In some cases,
Practice (1990); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game:
OrganizationalCooptation of a Profession, 1 Law & Soc'y Rev. 15 (1967) (finding that
public defenders are often more concerned with developing a reputation for
reasonableness and cooperativeness than with representing their clients through all
means at their disposal); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws,
14 L. & Soc'y Rev. 115 (1979) (reporting that, in small towns, lawyers representing
debtors in collection cases did not use the full range of available legal defense on
behalf of their clients, because most of their business came from local merchants who
would be unhappy with overly aggressive representation of debtors).
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it has proved to be fairly effective. There are ways to make nonlegal
regulation more effective. Perhaps these responses ought to be
considered, as an alternative or a supplement to increased legal
regulation, whenever some problematic aspect of legal practice
becomes known. In the case of discovery, it couldn't hurt.

Notes & Observations

